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ABSTRACT 
Losing a home affects not only the homeowner but the community at large. This thesis 
examines both housing and neighborhood characteristics to determine which characteristics have 
an impact on the speed of the sale of a foreclosed property. The findings from the Cox Proportional 
hazard model show which characteristics buyers value more when buying a foreclosed property. 
These characteristics can be different from the ones that are used to determine the sales price of a 
foreclosed property. Both financial institutions and real estate speculators can benefit from 
knowing which housing characteristics are preferred in a foreclosed property, allowing them to 
sell that property fast in the market.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The "American Dream” has become one of home ownership and recently this dream has 
become more attainable for many (Rohe and Watson, 2007). However, to eventually own a home, 
most people have to take out a mortgage, a real estate loan with property as the underlying asset. 
Traditionally, mortgages were 15 to 30 year loans which would be paid off gradually; "mortgage" 
coming from the French term "death pledge", meaning that you had your life to pay it off. 
However, as home ownership started increasing in the United States of America in the beginning 
of 1995, the mortgages to support these ownerships became greatly customized (US Census 
Bureau, 2007). 
 This increase of homeownership was in part made possible by subprime mortgages that 
target customers with lower credit ratings using interest rates that are above prime lending rates. 
The financial crisis in 2008, heightened defaults in the sub-prime mortgages category, and as a 
result the housing bubble burst. The number of foreclosure filings spiked by a stunning 81% 
between 2007 and 2008. The number of foreclosures was further increased nationally by about 
22% from nearly 2.3 million in 2008 to 2.8 million in 2010 (RealtyTrac, 2014).  Figure 1.1 provides 
the annual foreclosure filings from 2005 to 2012. While the economy has gradually recovered, the 
number of foreclosure filings remained above the level prior to 2008. 
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Figure1.1. Chart of U.S Annual Foreclosure Activity from 2005- 2012  
Source: RealtyTrac. 
One of the reasons why the financial downturn in 2008 had such a widespread effect was 
that these subprime and prime mortgages are important elements in the financial and the housing 
markets that are highly interdependent. To better understand the mutual downturn one must first 
understand how mortgages became traded investment assets. These debt obligations such as 
mortgage-backed securities are one important part of the housing bubble that burst in 2008. 
Mortgage-backed securities, or MBS, represent the cash flow payments that are from mortgage 
loans, mostly commercial and residential. Private companies, government agencies, or 
combinations of the two would then purchase the loans from banks and the loan originator.  The 
next step is known as securitization, which is defined by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission as when “the entity then issues securities that represent claims on the principal and 
interest payments made by borrowers on the loans in the pool” (SEC, 2014).  
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 Many of these securities were then issued by government organizations such as the 
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae, or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). Others 
that were issued by private firms were called “private-label” mortgage securities. Due to the 
government packaging of the securities, many investors felt that these securities were all backed 
by the US government and therefore were not risky assets. However, only the Ginnie Mae 
securities were fully backed, but both Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae enjoyed the ability to borrow 
money from the US Treasury. Further spreading the use of mortgage-backed securities was the 
fact that they can exist in many different forms. What grew to be very popular with investors is a 
type of MBS called a collateralized mortgage obligation. These obligations, also known as 
mortgage derivatives, allowed different risk rated MBS to be mixed so that the investor would be 
exposed to a desired amount of risk (SEC, 2014).  
Unfortunately, a problem arose when there was an economic downturn in 2008. The 
downturn caused people to lose their jobs or not have the ability to pay their mortgage. This then 
meant that people's properties were being foreclosed. However, while a bank plans for some 
foreclosures, they were often times left with more properties than they had expected. To make 
matters worse, the sudden surge in foreclosed and for sale houses made it so that many houses 
were now worth less than the bank had issued a mortgage for. This meant that not only was the 
bank stuck with a physical asset that was worth less than they paid for it, but also home owners 
who were still able to make payments were sometimes stuck paying a mortgage that was higher 
than the actual value of their house.  
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 When payments are not made on the mortgage and the property is foreclosed, the costs 
incur to all parties who are involved in the transaction, including the individual in default, the 
lender, and households living in the neighborhood. Some studies find that average costs related to 
foreclosures are about $27,000 for the city and $10,000 for the neighborhood of the foreclosure 
(Moreno, 1995).  Additionally, these costs will spread to city governments, which Apgar and Duda 
(2005) find can cost up to $30,000 per property in most cases. These neighborhood costs are the 
externalities associated with property values and quality of the neighborhood. Studies conducted 
on different aspects of foreclosures are beneficial and lead to better enacted policies that address 
this issue and reduce spillover effects to the society.  
1.1. Problem Statement 
Most scholars so far have discussed the foreclosure spillover effects having an impact on 
the neighborhood properties. Once a property is foreclosed, it needs to be transferred to a final 
user. This way, the property can be productive and the new owners can engage in maintaining the 
property which otherwise could result in vandalism (Campbell, 2011).  If houses are not occupied 
for a long period of time it can further worsen blight and reduce the desirability of the property. 
For this test purposes, if a house is sold after being foreclosed, it is considered as a resolved 
property. An unresolved property is one that has not been sold after facing foreclosure. Not many 
scholars have investigated what takes place after a property is being foreclosed.  
In that sense the gap exists in studying resolved and unresolved foreclosures. This study 
aims to fill that gap by focusing on factors that are likely to help resolved and unresolved 
properties.  To be included the foreclosed property would be one that has been unresolved during 
a certain period by using a similar data set used by Zhang et al. (2014) for Dallas County, Texas.  
The data set consists of foreclosures and sales transactions from 2004-2012. The methodology will 
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follow a similar survival analysis framework used by Towe and Lawley (2013). By using a Cox 
proportional hazard model, the likelihood of a property being resolved will be calculated by taking 
housing and neighborhood characteristics into consideration. This study will shed light on factors 
that help resolve foreclosed properties faster. A closer understanding about resolved and 
unresolved cases would help identify where the focus should be in housing markets and allow 
necessary actions to be taken accordingly.  
1.2. Implications 
Houses can be considered as illiquid assets if they are not occupied (Campbell et al, 2011). 
The liquidity of a house depends on many factors and is not limited to the price of the property 
alone (Kluger & Miller, 1990). When a borrower defaults, the ownership of the property is 
transferred to the bank/ financial institution that financed the mortgage loan. Financial institutions 
do not have an incentive to hold on to a vacant house and would attempt to sell it to another 
intermediate party or to a final user. Holding on to an unoccupied house does not bring the financial 
institution any revenue and this gives the motive to sell it as quickly as possible. Another drawback 
is the high maintenance costs associated with foreclosed properties. As discussed in previous 
sections, foreclosed houses are also prone to crime related activities and it brings a social disorder 
to the neighborhood (Immergluck & Smith, 2006). For all these reasons, financial institutions 
would like to transfer the ownership of a foreclosed property to another party.  
Investigating the types of housing characteristics that help to sell a property once it is 
foreclosed is useful to financial institutions that deal with mortgages. This will help them lend 
money to parties who are interested in properties that are desirable and easier to sell in the event 
of a foreclosure. For example, if a property with a detached carport has a tendency of sitting in the 
market for a long time, then investing money on such properties can be avoided. Real estate 
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speculators can also invest in foreclosed properties that have desirable characteristics as there is a 
higher chance of selling that property back in the market.  In return, this identifies which housing 
and neighborhood characteristics are preferred by most home buyers in the Dallas County.  
The rest of the paper will be as follows: Chapter 2 defines foreclosures and foreclosure 
practices, Chapter 3 looks into the previous work done by other scholars, Chapter 4 establishes the 
methodology, Chapter 5 discusses the results and finally Chapter 6 explains the limitations and the 
summary of the study.  
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CHAPTER 2. FORECLOSURES 
2.1. Foreclosure Definition 
A foreclosure can be defined as the process of taking possession of a mortgaged property 
after payments are not met, most often to be sold to recoup the loss. This process takes place once 
the home owner misses one or more monthly payments. Generally the foreclosure process would 
begin 3 -6 months after missing the first mortgage payment (U. S Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, 2014). Once the payments have been missed, the foreclosure process begins. 
The laws involved in the foreclosure process and the timeline of the actions taken usually depends 
on the individual state. According to the U.S department of Housing and Urban Development, it 
should be noted that the lender usually identifies borrower’s short term financial crisis. Therefore, 
it is important to stay in touch with the lender in the event of a missed payment.  Failing to make 
necessary arrangements would declare the borrower to be in default and the foreclosure process 
begins. 
2.2. Foreclosure Process 
In general the two main types of foreclosures are judicial and non-judicial. Both methods 
require public notices to be issued and all parties involved to be notified regarding the proceedings. 
One main difference between the two methods is that judicial foreclosures are mainly involved 
with the court. Under a judicial foreclosure, when a borrower misses one or more payments and 
show signs of defaulting on the mortgage, the lender can file a complaint with the court asking for 
permission to foreclose the property and take possession of it.  The lender will record a notice in 
the public land records about the property that is being foreclosed, and will notify the potential 
buyers, creditors and other interested parties.  The borrower can file a separate suit and save the 
property from being foreclosed. However, if the court decides that the borrower has defaulted, 
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permission to carry out a foreclosure will be granted to the borrower. This allows the borrower to 
recover the left over amount of the mortgage.  
Once permission is granted for a foreclosure, the court will authorize a sheriff’s sale. This 
is an auction of the property which is held in a public place. It is open to anyone for bidding and 
the highest bidder legally becomes the owner of the property. Most of the time, the lender wins 
the highest bid and becomes the owner of the property. This will be transferred to a final party who 
will occupy the house and end the foreclosure sale. Section 2.4 of the paper discusses the process 
of a foreclosure sale and the ownership transfer in detail. 
As previously mentioned, each state has different foreclosure practices. Once a borrower 
defaults on his/her mortgage, a redemption period helps the borrower to reclaim the house that has 
been foreclosed. The redemption period happens after a foreclosure takes place, where the 
borrower can pay the balance of the mortgage and all costs incurred during the foreclosure process 
to reclaim the house from the buyer (foreclosed sale). The availability of a redemption period 
mostly depends on whether the foreclosure process is judicial or non-judicial. For example, Texas 
is one of the states that do not allow the borrowers to have a redemption period. This is especially 
important because this study focuses on the foreclosure activities in the Dallas County of Texas. 
Given below in Table 1.1 is a list of states that practice the judicial foreclosure process. Both 
process and redemption periods are given in number of days.  
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Table 2.1. List of States that Follow Judicial Foreclosure Process  
Judicial Foreclosures 
State  
Process 
Period  
Redemption 
Period  
Connecticut  62 Court Decides  
Delaware  170-210  None  
Florida  135 None  
Illinois  300 90 
Indiana  261 None  
Kansas  130 365 
Kentucky  147 365 
Louisiana  180 None  
Maine  240 90 
Maryland  46 Court Decides  
Massachusetts  75 None  
Nebraska  142 None  
New jersey  270 10 
New Mexico  180 30-270  
New York  445 None  
North Dakota  150 180-365  
Ohio  217 None  
Pennsylvania  270 None  
South 
Carolina  
150 None  
Vermont  95 180-365  
Source: RealtyTrac.com 
Unlike judicial foreclosures, the second type of foreclosure process, the non-judicial 
foreclosure, does not have any interventions from the court. Most cases are handled by attorneys 
following a state mandated process. The requirements for this process are established by state 
statute which varies across states. Just as discussed in the judicial foreclosures sections, once the 
borrower defaults on the mortgage, a default letter will be mailed out to him/her. It is then recorded 
in the county’s recorder's office and is posted in public places. At the end of the notice period (this 
can differ according to the state), the foreclosure sale will take place and the highest bidder 
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becomes the owner of the property (Mortgage Bankers Association, 2014). Given below in Table 
1.2 is a list of states that only follow a non-judicial foreclosure process.  
Table 2.2. List of States that Follow Non-Judicial Foreclosure Process  
Non-judicial Foreclosures 
State Comment 
Process 
Period 
Redemption 
Period 
Michigan 
Non-judicial 
Only 
60 30-365 
New Hampshire 
Non-judicial 
Only 
59 None 
Tennessee 
Non-judicial 
Only 
40-45 730 
Utah 
Non-judicial 
Only 
142 Court Decides 
Washington 
D.C. 
Trustee Sale 
Only 
47 None 
West Virginia 
Trustee Sale 
Only 
60-90 None 
Source: RealtyTrac.com 
Some states are not limited to just one foreclosure process. These states follow both judicial 
and non-judicial foreclosure processes. However even in these states, one process is followed more 
often than the other. In the table given below, the comment section specifies if both methods are 
used or one is preferred over the other.  
  
11 
 
 Table 2.3. List of States that Follow both Foreclosure Processes  
States with both Foreclosure Types 
State Comment 
Process 
Period 
Redemption 
Period 
Alabama Judicial Rarely 49-74 365 
Alaska Judicial Rarely 105 365* 
Arizona Judicial Rarely 90+ 30-180* 
Arkansas Both 70 365* 
California Judicial Rarely 117 365* 
Colorado Judicial Rarely 145 None 
Georgia Judicial Rarely 37 None 
Hawaii Both 220 None 
Idaho Trustee Sale 150 365 
Iowa 
Trustee Sale 
Voluntary 
160 20 
Minnesota Non-judicial Mostly 90-100 180 
Mississippi Non-judicial Mostly 90 None 
Missouri Non-judicial Mostly 60 365 
Montana Trustee Sale Mostly 150 None 
Nevada Trustee Sale Mostly 116 None 
North 
Carolina 
Non-judicial Mostly 110 None 
Oklahoma Judicial Mostly 186 None 
Oregon Trustee Sale Mostly 150 180 
Rhode Island Non-judicial Mostly 62 None 
South Dakota Judicial Mostly 150 30-365 
Texas Non-judicial Mostly 27 None 
Virginia Trustee Sale Mostly 45 None 
Wisconsin Judicial Mostly 290 365 
Wyoming Non-judicial Mostly 60 90-365 
*these redemption periods are only for judicial foreclosure process. 
Source: RealtyTrac.com 
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2.3. Texas Overview 
Texas was the 28th state to join the United States of America, and the only one to be an 
independent covering nation before joining. Following California, Texas is the second most 
populated state and following Alaska, it is the second largest state. Beyond these facts and figures, 
Texas is famous for “open spaces and cheap property” (Gopal, 2013). This has become 
increasingly important as Texas is facing a steady increase in its population. According to the Real 
Estate Center at Texas A& M and Atlas Van Lines (Texas A&M, 2014), Texas has had a surplus 
of inbound movers for the 9 years prior to 2014. This has led to 22.8% population growth from 
1990 to 2000 and a 20.6% population growth from 2000 to 2010 (US Census, 2000; 2010). On the 
state level, it would appear that the Texas housing market has been doing quite well during the 
recession and is facing a quick recovery; however that may not be true for each of the 254 counties. 
2.3.1. Dallas County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Map of Dallas County Location  
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Dallas County (highlighted in Figure 1.2.) is located in the North Eastern part of Texas, 
with the county seat and largest city being Dallas. The county has a population of nearly 2.4 million 
and it is the ninth most populated county in America (US Census, 2010). The county has over 
800,000 households with many of those being located in the Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington 
metropolitan area. The demographics of the county are approximately 38% Hispanic, 33% White, 
22% Black, 5% Asian and 14% from other races. Dallas County is facing the same recovery as 
much of the country and the star of Texas. Along with this recovery Dallas County has benefited 
from an increase in house prices, with the mean price of a house sold in August 2014 being almost 
15% higher than a year prior. Even with this, Dallas County continues to rank as one of the top 
affordable regions in the National Association of Realtors’ Affordability Index (2014).  
Dallas County has seventeen different school districts. In the latter part of the paper, the 
study will determine whether school districts have a role to play in determining house prices in 
foreclosed properties. According to an accountability report done in 2011 by Texas Education 
Agency, the school districts are ranked according to ranks given to each individual school in the 
district and averaging it to arrive at an overall rank. The four categories for the ranks are 
exemplary, recognized, academically accepted and academically unacceptable. Two school 
districts with exemplary ranks are Highland Park and Sunnyvale. The five school districts that 
have recognized ranks are Carrolton Farmers Branch, Cedar Hill, Mesquite, Coppell and 
Richardson. School districts with academically acceptable ranks are Dallas, Garland, Irving, 
Lancaster, Grand Prairie, Desoto and Duncanville. Figure 2.3, shows fifteen school districts of the 
Dallas County.  
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Figure 2.2. School District Map of Dallas County 
Source: www.dallascountytexas.us 
2.3.2. Texas Foreclosure Process 
The foreclosure process in Texas has a very short timeline once the borrower is in default. 
Both judicial and non-judicial practice of foreclosure is practiced in the state. Typically the 
timeline expands to about 60 days, but with the exclusion of the right to redemption, homeowners 
can lose their house in less than 41 days. Judicial foreclosure process takes place if no power of 
sale clauses or deed of trust exists in a mortgage. The process is similar to the general judicial 
foreclosure process mentioned in the previous section. With a power of sale clause specifying the 
time and terms of a sale, the foreclosure would be conducted as a non-judicial foreclosure.  In the 
event of having a power of sale clause with no indication of terms of sale, the process will be 
carried out in the following manner. First, prior to the foreclosure process a lender must mail the 
letter of demand to the borrower asking for the balanced payment to be made within 20 days. In 
the second stage, where the 20 day limit has expired, the foreclosure process must begin by filing 
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it with a country clerk. In this stage, the notice must be sent to the borrower and posted at the 
county courthouse door. In the final stage, the foreclosure must take place on the first Tuesday of 
any month. At the auction where the property is sold, anyone can bid and the highest bidder would 
then receive the ownership of the foreclosed property. 
2.4. Ownership Transfer Process 
When homeowners miss or start making late mortgage payments, it can often lead to 
foreclosure. Once a house is foreclosed, the ownership of that house can be transferred to three 
possible parties. These parties are the bank, the investor and the final owner. Once a foreclosure is 
inevitable, a property is either auctioned or settled through a short sale. When a property is 
auctioned, the ownership will transfer in four different ways. The first possibility would be if a 
bank receives the ownership, the property will eventually be transferred to the final owner or to an 
investor. Because of the bank’s role in the auctioning process, the property referred to as Real 
Estate Owned (REO). Another possibility is in the case of the investor receiving the ownership 
from the bank, the property will then be transferred to a final owner. The third potential way is that 
at the auctions held for a foreclosed property, an investor can bid the highest price and receive the 
ownership of the property. As stated in the previous scenario, the property will then be transferred 
to a final owner. Finally, the most straightforward ownership transfer takes place when the final 
owner itself bids the highest price at the auctions and becomes the final owner of the property. A 
visualization of this information is available in Figure 2.3. 
In the case of a missed mortgage payment, the alternative method to foreclosure is a short 
sale. The short sale requires approval from the lender as there will be a difference in the mortgage 
balance payment. The shortage of the payment arises from the lower price that is placed on the 
property. The price of the property is lower than the remaining mortgage loan payments. If the 
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lender identifies and confirms that the borrowers do not have enough funds to pay off the mortgage 
payments, the short sale avoids the house being foreclosed. Another incidence where a short sale 
will take place is when a homeowner wants to move to a different property. However, before a 
short sale the lender will determine whether a short sale is beneficial over a foreclosure or not. If 
all the elements are met and the short sale is successful, the ownership of the property will be 
transferred to the final owner. This process too can be seen in Figure 2.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Foreclosure Ownership Transfer Process 
The percentage of properties owned by a bank (REO) after the auctions is usually high. 
Out of all potential outcomes, most foreclosed properties after auctions are owned by the REO and 
it represents the majority of the foreclosure outcome. This paper mainly focuses on the first two 
scenarios ( REO ) represented by Figure 2.3, where the bank is directly involved.  
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The financial crisis in 2008 heightened the foreclosure activities in most of the states. This 
increase in foreclosure activities gained attention by many scholars, leading them to further 
investigate foreclosures' impact on the society. In general, foreclosures have been identified as 
bringing in externalities to the neighborhoods. These externalities range from affecting the 
neighboring property values to general neighborhood spillovers such as vandalism and crime.   
3.1. Foreclosure Spillover Effects on Neighboring Property Values 
Spillovers occur when the presence of a foreclosed property starts to affect the houses in 
the surrounding area. Immergluck and Smith (2006) found external costs related to foreclosure 
activities on single – family property values. To research the effect they use a hedonic regression 
model to estimate the impact of foreclosures on the sales price of a property by using data of 1997-
1998 foreclosure activities for Chicago. They find the increase of foreclosure activities within one 
eighth of a mile caused prices to decline by 0.9% of the house value. Furthermore, they describe 
the disorders foreclosures can bring in to a community through abandoned properties and criminal 
activities. The authors point out the need to study more about foreclosure related topics to enforce 
efficient policies to reduce the overall cost to the society.  
The spillover studies conducted previously by Immergluck and Smith (2006) are extended 
by Lin, Rosenblatt and Yao (2009) who incorporate the spillover effects into a pricing based model 
based on the comparable properties theory.  They use two major factors of discounts; the 
foreclosure sale and the weight placed on the foreclosure to evaluate the neighborhood property 
values. The Chicago Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA) data were used for the study 
as it is a highly concentrated foreclosure area. The results of the study report that as the time and 
space between a foreclosed house and a chosen subject property increase, the spillover effects 
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decrease.  An 8.7% discount is the most severe number reported for the neighborhood property 
values within 300 feet and two years of liquidation. The values calculated for a sample of data for 
2003, as opposed to the 2006 sample, report a price discount of only 5%. This is understandable 
as the housing market conditions in 2003 were better than the housing market conditions that 
prevailed in 2006. 
 Further exploring the spillover effects of foreclosures are Leonard and Murdoch (2009), 
who present how foreclosures can change the neighborhood quality. The authors improve upon 
previous studies on spillover effects by introducing a spatial auto-correlation model and analyzing 
properties in the foreclosure process. This is important as the neighborhood quality is neglected 
most often during the time a foreclosure is taking place. Results from this study show robust 
evidence for decreased prices in the selling prices of houses within 250 feet of foreclosed activities 
for both sold and unsold properties in Dallas County, Texas for 2006. These results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that residents of a neighborhood with foreclosed activities reduce spending on 
maintenance which contributes to a neighborhood quality decrease.  
Many authors have explored the hypothesis that when the number of foreclosures in a 
neighborhood increases, housing prices in that area will decrease. Using a data set for foreclosure 
activities in St. Louis County, Missouri from 1998-2007, Rogers and Winter (2009) measure the 
impact of foreclosures on house prices. The time period used for the study allowed for more 
flexibility in terms of foreclosure effects by allowing them to be observed over time and across 
space.  The hedonic model used contains spatial and temporal dimensions and control for 
unobserved neighborhood characteristics. However, any qualitative effects of foreclosure events 
are not accounted for in this model. The findings suggest that, as expected, the prices decline for 
neighboring houses, but these effects show a more localized trend. Another interesting result, along 
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with the significant results for foreclosure impacts, is how the marginal impact for a foreclosure 
declined rather than increasing, in both cross section and over time. Unfortunately, the reasons for 
this decline were not explored by the authors.    
 In their paper, Kobie and Lee (2011), address the impact of residential foreclosures on 
single family residential property values by improving upon the work of Immergluck and Smith 
(2006). One particular issue Kobie and Lee address is the use of a straight line distance approach 
which ignores the structural details about each observation such as highways, parks etc.  Therefore, 
the proximity measures are evaluated by introducing the face block unit. A face block unit includes 
only houses that are on the same street, to the left and the right and on the other side of the street 
from one intersection to another (Kobie and Lee, 2011). Using this improved method the authors 
explore two main hypotheses. First, a foreclosed property on the same face block as a house that 
is "for sale" will drive down the price of the latter house and second, that the duration of the 
foreclosure process will have an impact on the houses in the same face block unit. To test these 
hypotheses the authors use data from 2005-2007 for Cuyahoga County, Ohio, as the number of 
foreclosure activities has been increasing in that area 
 When running the model, Kobie and Lee divided the data into three categories of city, 
suburban and county level foreclosures. As an overall result, the first hypothesis held true for both 
the suburbs and the county categories and the negative impact from foreclosed properties in the 
same face block is proven to be significant due to delayed maintenance activities.  The second 
hypothesis held true only for county level model, confirming that properties that had foreclosure 
processes stretched out for more than 12 months would have a negative impact on sales prices. 
From the three models (Cleveland, Suburban and  Cuyahoga), the Cuyahoga model further pointed 
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out the importance of classifying foreclosure properties as “pre-foreclosures” and “post 
foreclosures” as results can be different before and after an auction sale is held.  
Campbell, Giglio and Pathak (2011) examine the differences between forced sales and 
unforced sales. Forced sales are more likely to occur after a house is foreclosed, close to the time 
of death of an owner or when facing bankruptcy. The authors find that in the state of Massachusetts 
forced sale houses have a lower price than other house sales. Results indicate that the largest 
discount rate of 27% applied to foreclosed house sales with the lowest at 3% for bankruptcy related 
sales.  
 In an attempt to investigate the existence of heterogeneity in the neighborhood price 
effects, Zhang and Leonard (2014) apply a quantile regression method and find that negative price 
externalities caused by foreclosures are highest in lower-priced homes. By using the quantile 
regression method, they account for differences across lower-priced houses and higher-priced 
houses for different time periods as well as distances. They examine the issue by using foreclosure 
and sales data from 2007-2009 for Dallas County. Having 4 different rings ranging from 0 to 
1500ft, they incorporate the distance factor and find that within 250 ft the negative price 
externalities are the greatest. The study further points out why preventing lower-priced 
foreclosures should have more policies and how it can help reduce negative externalities to the 
neighborhood.  
Many studies discuss the impact of foreclosures on neighboring property values by using 
a hedonic regression model.  Harding et al (2009) focus on a possible contagion effect with regard 
to foreclosed properties and their externalities.  They use a repeat sales approach which reduces 
the omitted variable problem often encountered with hedonic models. The method is an extension 
to the original method suggested by Bailey et al., (1963) with Schwartz et al., (2003) and Harding 
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et al., (2007). The model specifically controls for property characteristics to prevent having any 
differences in the repeat sales regression. A negative contagion effect of 1% was observed from 
nearby distressed properties.  As the distance between a foreclosed property and a non-distressed 
property increased, the contagion effect declined suggesting that beyond a distance of 500 feet, no 
significant contagion effects can be observed. This is determined by looking at repeat sales details 
for Atlanta, Charlotte, Columbus, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Memphis, and St. Louis from 1989-
2007.  The timing of the foreclosure sale is important as the results find an increasing contagion 
discount when the foreclosure was inevitable for properties located within 300 feet for a foreclosed 
property. Although smaller values are obtained by this research, it supports the idea that immediate 
neighbors are affected by negative externalities proposed by prior literature. 
Another study that examines the contagion effect of neighboring foreclosures is done by 
Towe and Lawley in 2013. An increase in the trend of strategic default means more people are 
walking away from their home mortgages even though the payments can be made. Towe and 
Lawley (2013) test out a possible contagion effect of neighboring foreclosures based on social 
interactions by using spatially explicit parcel level data in Maryland from 2006- 2009. Panel data 
is used in an attempt to avoid simultaneity problems that arise as a result of including social 
interactions. As seen in other papers, the contagion effect discussed in this paper was highly 
localized. The authors find that the increase of the foreclosure hazard ratio of 18% was due to a 
1% increase of a neighbor in foreclosure.  Neighbors of a property are defined as the 13 nearest 
houses and when the number of foreclosures increased from zero to four within the neighborhood, 
increase of foreclosure hazard ratio was 4.4% to 6.5%. Thus, the multiplier effects of the likelihood 
of neighbors defaulting on their loans after observing others in foreclosure can lead to a series of 
foreclosure activities within neighborhoods 
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3.2. Short Sale Spillover Effects 
Currently, more studies have focused on non-distressed sales; however, Daneshvary, 
Clauretie and Kader (2011) approach the spillover effects from a distressed residential properties 
perspective. To achieve this, they use 2008 data for Las Vegas, Nevada because most of the sale 
transactions of this data were REO sales. The approach is different as they attempt to estimate the 
size of the discount for houses sold using a short sale method. The three types of distressed 
properties considered in this study are short sales, sales in the process for foreclosure, and sales 
after lender’s repossession (REO). Some of the conditions previous studies did not control for 
variables such as status of the sold properties, physical condition of a property, and endogenous 
time on the market that affect transaction prices are all controlled in this study. 
 While a short sale can suffer from its own pricing discount factor, the study done by 
Daneshvary et al (2011) proves that it does not produce a spillover effect as other distressed 
properties do. Although short sale properties do not, both REO and properties that are in the middle 
of a foreclosure process tend to have similar spillover effects.  The marginal spillover effect is 
reported as 1% for REO sales within 0.1 miles from a non-distressed home. When the distance 
increases from 0.1 to 0.5 miles, the spillovers decrease from 0.7% to 0.4%. Furthermore, the 
discount for distressed properties shows a significantly high own-price discount values ranging 
from 10%- 19%.  
Also addressing toxic spillover effects is the paper by Danaeshvary and Clauretie (2010. 
In their paper, the authors use a hedonic pricing model to look at the effect of foreclosures on 
nearby houses. As previous studies have done, they develop a distance weight matrix in order to 
determine the role that distance of a foreclosed property plays on house sales price. The results of 
the study show that a REO property within 3 months and within .1 miles has a -2.9% effect on 
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nearby houses, but decreases to -1.9% and 1.3% for .25 and .5 mile radius respectively.  However, 
they note that when market trend and unobservable neighborhood characteristics are controlled, 
the role of an REO diminishes. 
3.3. Non-Price Related Foreclosure Spillover Effects on the Neighborhood 
Not all research related foreclosures have focused on spillover price effects. For example, 
Immergluck and Smith (2006) examine the relationship between crime and foreclosures. The study 
looks at both violent and property crimes in the neighborhood for Chicago using crime and 
neighborhood characteristics variables. Skogan (1990) explains how abandoned buildings can 
harm a neighborhood in different ways. In the same ways, foreclosed houses may also appeal to 
people for criminal and drug related activities. This is especially true for lower-income 
neighborhoods, when compared to the number of criminal activities that take place in high-income 
neighborhoods (Immergluck and Smith, 2006). Immergluck and Smith find significant results for 
an increase in violent crimes in the neighborhood as a result of foreclosures. When other things 
are held equal, this increase is about 2.33% for every 0.01% increase in foreclosure rates in a tract. 
However, the authors do not find significant results for an increase in property crimes as a result 
of foreclosure activities 
The effects of foreclosures can be much more detrimental than just forced eviction. Lower 
property values, reduction in a local property tax base, increase in crime related activities, and a 
disruption in social ties are some of the many spillover effects (Lee 2008). As a result of 
foreclosure, houses that are poorly maintained are prone to attract vandalism and crime related 
activities. This is supported by Ellen, Lacoe and Sharygin (2012) with similar findings about the 
impact foreclosures have on neighboring block faces. Properties that are sold through REO method 
are more likely to face these spillovers. The results do not suggest any increase in new crimes, but 
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once a foreclosure hits a neighborhood monitoring them closely can prevent some crime related 
activities. 
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CHAPTER 4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Data 
The data used for this study contains foreclosure and sales data for Dallas County, Texas. 
The main source for the sales data is University of Texas at Dallas Real Estate Research Database. 
It includes a detailed list of variables such as the account number, latitude and longitude 
coordinates, housing characteristics, historic sale prices and sales data for the Dallas County. The 
summary statistics of some of the major housing characteristics are listed in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1. The Summary Statistic Table for Housing Characteristics 
 
 
Variable         Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Attached 
Garage House with attached garage 0.782176 0.4127737 0 1 
Attached 
Carport House with attached carport 0.0468333 0.211285 0 1 
Detached 
Carport House with detached carport 0.0220654 0.1468985 0 1 
Pool House with swimming pool 0.0805036 0.2720756 0 1 
Slab House with slab foundation 0.7583619 0.4280829 0 1 
Central Heat House with central heat 0.9145682 0.2795276 0 1 
Central AC House with central ac 0.9000699 0.2999115 0 1 
Baths Number of baths 2.028075 0.6889137 0 10 
Lot Area Size of lot area in thousands of square feet 9.57534 9.944437 1.034877 468.1696 
Living Area 
Size of living area in thousands of square 
feet 1.796294 0.7967797 0.528 11.014 
Fireplace House with a fire place 0.6453962 0.4784007 0 1 
Story 1 House with one story 0.7645619 0.4242791 0 1 
Story1.5 House with one and a half stories 0.097927 0.2972206 0 1 
Story 2 House with two stories 0.1364619 0.3432839 0 1 
Effective 
Age Years since last refurbished/ built 36.00232 20.10938 6 115 
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Further information comes from other sources, such as the list of foreclosures from 2005- 
2010 comes from the RealtyTrac database. RealtyTrac is a commercial database that contains 
many U.S real estate and other related data. In general, it has information and data on 
preforeclosure, auctions, bank owned (REO) and all recently sold properties.  The list of 
foreclosure data collected from RealtyTrac was geocoded and spatially merged in to the real estate 
database. This step was necessary in identifying resolved foreclosures in the database. A resolved 
foreclosure in the data base was recognized as a market sale that took place after the foreclosure, 
but before July, 2012.The unresolved foreclosure in this case, was where no market sale 
information was found before July 2012 for a particular foreclosed property. Thus, the status of 
these properties after July, 2012 is not known.  
Looking at the data, the highest lot area from the data set is reported as 468,169.6 sq ft 
while the lowest is 1034.877 sq ft.  The total living area of a house has the lowest value of 528 sq 
ft and the highest being 11,014 sq ft. The most modern house was only 6 years old, while the oldest 
house was 115. 
 The next section of data, which includes neighborhood characteristics, is collected from 
American Community Survey 2006-2010 from the US Census data. The main categories of these 
variables are the race, age and poverty levels. The highest number of below poverty percentage is 
seen in the neighborhood is 83.96% and the highest number of school aged children (5-17) is 
47.12%.  A description of variables used is listed in the summary statistics table for neighborhood 
characteristics in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2. The Summary Statistics for Neighborhood Characteristics 
 
The use of Cox proportional hazard model requires a main time variable; the time variable 
used in this study is the time to resolution (t2r). This variable is calculated by taking the time 
difference between a foreclosure and the sale of that particular property. For any property that was 
not sold, July 2012 was given as the date of the sale to calculate the variable t2r. Even though a 
sale date is given for unsold properties for calculation purposes, the property is still considered as 
an unresolved case. Hazard models take the occurrence of an event into consideration. For this 
study the event is defined as the sale of the property, which is technically considered as a failure 
event in survival analysis. 
Another section of variables for this study is the inclusion of school districts. Out of the 17 
school districts for the Dallas County, 14 of them are included in the study to control for any socio-
geographic effects. The included sales districts are Carrollton-Farmers B ISD, Dallas ISD, Cedar 
Hill ISD, Garland ISD, Highland Park ISD, Irving ISD, Lancaster ISD, Mesquite ISD, Coppell 
ISD, Grand Prairie ISD, Richardson, Desoto ISD and Duncanville ISD are included. Some of the 
school districts were dropped as the observations were too small to obtain a significant result. 
Finally, the Sunnyvale ISD is the base case for these dummy variables so the results will measure 
the effect of the school district against Sunnyvale.  
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
White The percentage of white people in the 
neighborhood 
0.3217089 0.2443916 0 1 
School Age The percentage of households with school age 
children(5-17) 
0.2109185 0.0700638 0 0.4712203 
Community 
Older than 60 
The percentage of people who are 60 and above in 
the neighborhood 
0.0809088 0.0639499 0 0.5962733 
Below poverty The percentage of people are below the poverty 
line in the neighborhood 
0.1373073 0.1280769 0 0.8396861 
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To further round out the characteristics and potential factors that might affect foreclosure 
sales seven house condition dummies are also included. These dummies are used to capture house 
quality effects on the time to resolution with the two ends of the housing quality being Excellent 
and Unsound. Furthermore, five foreclosure year dummy variables are used to account for yearly 
foreclosure effects with the base year being 2005. Finally, the season dummy variable of winter 
will account for any seasonal effects as well. A detailed list of all dummy variables can be found 
in the appendix section.  
When looking at the sales prices for the foreclosed houses, the total number of houses sold 
for the time period from 2005-2012 is 22,699 with a mean price of $112,781.6 dollars. The highest 
price for a foreclosed property reported is $3,999,500 and the lowest is $1,200 dollars. Given 
below is a graph that breaks down the average sales price for a foreclosed house by the year it was 
sold.  
Figure 4.1. Mean Sale Price of Foreclosures by Year 
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As seen on the graph, there is a decline in the average sales price in 2008 and 2009, but it 
increases in 2010. By 2012 the average sales price for foreclosed sales increase up to $140,099. 
The total number of foreclosed houses sold has the highest number in 2008, which is 5996.  
4.2. Methodology 
In this section, the two main methods used in the study will be discussed. The first method 
will look at factors that affect time to resolution by using the Cox proportional hazard model. The 
second estimation used in the study which focuses on factors that impact sales price of foreclosed 
properties, will use the traditional hedonic regression method.  
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is a statistical tool that is used to find the best model to 
explain variations in the data.  It is the line that best fits the observed data by minimizing the 
distance between observed data and predicted data. Using this method, the independent variables 
of housing characteristics, neighborhood characteristics and dummy variables for school districts, 
condition of the house, foreclosure year and winter can be regressed on the dependent variable of 
time to resolution. 
The model can be written as  
𝑡2𝑟 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝐶 + 𝛿𝑁 +  𝛾𝐷 +  𝜀 (4.1) 
Where t2r  is the dependent variable; the time to resolution, C is a vector of housing 
characteristics, N is a vector of neighborhood characteristics, D represents all the dummy variables 
including  house condition dummy for all conditions, school district dummy for all districts 
,foreclosure year dummy  and a seasonal dummy for winter.  
However, using an OLS method assumes that residuals are distributed normally. This 
assumption of normality is not suitable when analyzing survival data. The time to an event may 
not be the same in every case. Therefore, OLS regressions when associated with time distribution 
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data can run into nonsymmetric and bimodal problems. This is where survival analysis proves to 
be a good method to analyze survival data. The survival method has two main advantages when 
compared with the traditional OLS method. First, survival methods can distinguish between 
uncensored and right censored data. Second, it can account for covariates than can change over 
time. Because of this, OLS regressions are considered as time invariant models. Survival methods 
can easily incorporate time varying variables when compared to traditional methods. 
4.2.1. Survival Analysis 
Survival analysis is a method used in many fields, where the survival time until the 
occurrence of an event can be calculated.  It is widely used in the medical field to calculate death 
and failure rates. In the social science field, this method is applied to calculate the survival or risk 
rates associated with a particular event taking place. 
When an individual or any other applicable entity is chosen to conduct a survival analysis, 
the transition from one stage to the other is considered as the “event”. The starting point of the 
event can be determined according to the type of the study and varies across different types. It 
should be noted that this starting point is not necessarily the point of origin. For example, a 
foreclosure rate for a particular county can be calculated from 2010-2013 using the survival 
method. If a different time period is chosen, that means it would have a different starting point. 
The foreclosure is the event that is being observed during the time period.  
The mathematical components of survival analysis can be expressed in the following way. 
𝐹(𝑡) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑(𝑢) = Pr(𝑇 ≤ 𝑡)
𝑡
0
        (4.2) 
  T would be defined as a positive random variable denoting survival time (it is considered to be 
continuous). The actual survival time is denoted as t.  The probability distribution characterized 
by a probability density function f (t) and cumulative distribution function, F (t) 
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Where the survival time T is less than or equal to some value t, the density function f(t) 
𝑓(𝑡) =
𝑑𝐹(𝑡)
𝑑(𝑡)
= 𝐹′(𝑡) (4.3) 
The survivor function S(t) can be expressed as 
𝑆(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡) = Pr( 𝑇 ≤ 𝑡) (4.4) 
Survivor function is the probability of surviving longer than t. This is the probability that there is 
no failure event occurring prior to t. Survivor function, in the beginning (t=0) takes the value of 1, 
and it decreases toward zero as t goes to infinity. Therefore survivor function can be described as 
a monotone non-increasing function in time.  
The hazard function which is commonly known as failure rate, conditional failure rate and 
force of mortality is the instantaneous failure rate, given that a subject has survived until that time.  
It is the probability that the failure event will occur in an interval, on the condition that the subject 
has survived to the beginning of a particular interval when divided by the width of the interval. 
Thus, it can be expressed as  
ℎ(𝑡) = lim
∆𝑡→0
𝑃(𝑡 +  ∆𝑡 > 𝑇 > 𝑡|𝑇 > 𝑡)
∆𝑡
 (4.5) 
The hazard rate is the relationship between the failure time and the survival function which can be 
expressed as  
ℎ (𝑡) =
𝑓(𝑡)
𝑆(𝑡)
 (4.6) 
where ℎ (𝑡) is the hazard rate, 𝑓(𝑡) is the density function and 𝑆(𝑡) is the survivor function. Hazard 
rates can vary from of zero to infinity. A zero hazard rate indicates that the subject faces no risk of 
experiencing the event and infinity indicates the certainty of the facing an event at that instant 
itself. The hazard rates can increase, decrease, be constant or even take other shapes.   
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Another important function that can be derived from the hazard function in survival 
analysis is the cumulative hazard. Knowing the hazard function gives the ability to determine most 
of the other functions. The, cumulative hazard can be written as 
𝐻(𝑡) = ∫ ℎ(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑡
0
 (4.7) 
This enables us to write survival and hazard functions in a more convenient manner. Cumulative 
hazard function is the total number of expected failure rates for a subject, and it has unit number 
of failures.  
Since the time period is dependent upon the needs of a researcher, there is no mention of 
the data before and after the time that is specified. This leads to the concept of censoring. Censoring 
occurs when the survival times are not observed beyond the time period that is mentioned in a 
study. Not all subjects will experience the event. If a subject hasn’t experienced the event by the 
end time, it is called as “right censored”. There is a chance where the subject may have experienced 
this before the starting time of the study. Such cases are known as “left truncation”. If the censored 
data is omitted from the study, it leads to a biased data set. To avoid the problem of selection bias, 
binary method together with the likelihood method can be used. However, the survival analysis 
method has the capability of handling censored data than other methods. 
In survival methods the three main models can be considered as the non-parametric, 
parametric and the semi-parametric models. Each has different assumptions made about the hazard 
ratio and relationship of covariates in the model.  The selection of the method depends on the 
researcher’s particular needs for a study. 
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4.2.1.1. Non-Parametric Model 
In non-parametric method, there are no assumptions made about the distribution of the 
dependent variable. The estimates are calculated by using the survivor function. The survivor 
function gives the probability of surviving until an event takes place. As there are no assumptions 
made about the shape of the hazard ratio and how covariates affect the shape of the hazard ratio, 
this method has the advantage of understanding more about the data itself and produce more 
descriptive results. One of the main disadvantages of the method is the inability of comparing 
many groups and including multiple covariates. The most common non-parametric method is the 
Kaplan-Meier method.  
4.2.1.1.1. Kaplan-Meier  
Originally this method was developed by Kaplan and Meier in 1958.Kaplan-Meier (KM) 
method can take right censoring into account and empirically calculate the probability of surviving 
past a certain time.  Thus, it can describe the survivorship of a population that is being studied. 
Most studies use this method to compare two study population and their respective survival times.  
The graphical presentation helps to understand how the survival times change. As discussed 
earlier, it cannot accommodate covariates and control for time varying variables. Survivor function 
for the Kaplan-Meier can be written as 
?̂? = ∏ (
𝑛𝑗 − 𝑑𝑗
𝑛𝑗
)
𝑗 |𝑡𝑗   ≤𝑡
 (4.8) 
where 𝑡1, 𝑡2…, 𝑡𝑘 are the failure times, where for each 𝑗,  𝑛𝑗  is the number of individuals at risk 
just before  𝑡𝑗, and where 𝑑𝑗  is the number of individual who failed at time  𝑡𝑗. 
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4.2.1.2. Parametric Models 
These models can directly exhibit the time dependency when using event history data by 
specifying a distribution function for the failure rates. This means that the shape of the hazard rate 
is specified in these models. Unless the shape of the hazard line can be justified with a strong 
theoretical background, the parametric model will not provide accurate results for any given 
sample size. Shape of the baseline hazard function directly depends on the covariates due to its 
parameterization. Therefore, the time dependency of the data changes with the number and the 
nature of the covariates included in the model. The advantage of this method is the ability to get 
more precise parameter estimates if the assumptions made about the model are correct. This on the 
other hand becomes a disadvantage when the correct hazard function is not specified.  Furthermore, 
it will lead to biased parameters estimates and it can be very sensitive in the presence of omitted 
variables. Examples for some of the parametric models are Exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, Log 
–Logistic and Log-Normal. 
4.2.1.2.1. Exponential Model 
Exponential model is a very simple model where the baseline hazard rate is flat. This 
simply means based on the covariates the risk of an event taking place is same at all time-points. 
The shape of the hazard line suggests a constant hazard rate. The exponential hazard can be 
expressed as  
ℎ0 (𝑡) = exp(𝑎). (4.9) 
If this is incorporated in to the exponential model then it gives the following equation 
ℎ (𝑡 |𝑥𝑗) = exp(𝑎 +  𝑥𝑗𝑏). (4.10) 
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This can be implied in terms of hazard and survivor function as 
𝐻0(𝑡) = exp(𝑎)𝑡, (4.11) 
and 
𝑆0(𝑡) = exp{ − exp(𝑎)𝑡} (4.12) 
In return, the equations can be rewritten for both hazard and survivor methods as 
𝐻(𝑡|𝑥𝑗 𝑏) = exp(𝑎 + 𝑥𝑗 𝑏 ) 𝑡 (4.13) 
and  
𝑆(𝑡|𝑥𝑗 𝑏) = exp{ −𝑒𝑥𝑝 exp(𝑎 + 𝑥𝑗 𝑏 ) 𝑡} (4.14) 
One of the major disadvantages of using the exponential method is that beyond a certain 
time period survival time observed still has an exponential distribution. Another flaw of this 
method is how a single parameter fully determines the distribution. Once the mean is calculated, 
the variance is considered to be fixed and it cannot be estimated separately from data.  
4.2.1.2.2. Weibull Model 
The Weibull model is more flexible when compared with the exponential model.  The 
major characteristic of this model is the monotonic nature of the baseline hazard function. It can 
be monotonically increasing, decreasing or flat with respect to time. An exponential model also 
gives a flat baseline hazard rate which can be classified as a special case of the Weibull method.  
The Weibull model allows the hazard to change with respect to time. If the increasing and 
decreasing hazard rate can be justified for a particular event taking place, then the use of Weibull 
method can be justified. 
The baseline hazard rate of the Weibull method can be expressed as 
ℎ0 (𝑡) = 𝑝𝑡
𝑝−1exp (𝑎). (4.15) 
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By substituting this into the hazard model, the equation can be written as 
𝐻(𝑡|𝑥𝑗 ) = 𝑝𝑡
𝑝−1 exp(𝑎 +  𝑥𝑗𝑏). (4.16) 
This implies  
𝐻0(𝑡) = exp(𝑎)𝑡
𝑝, (4.17) 
and 
𝑆0(𝑡) = exp { − exp(𝑎)𝑡
𝑝}. (4.18) 
Finally, the complete hazard and survival models can be written as 
𝐻(𝑡|𝑥𝑗 𝑏) = exp (𝑎 +  𝑥𝑗𝑏)𝑡
𝑝, (4.19) 
and 
𝑆(𝑡|𝑥𝑗 𝑏) = exp{ −𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑎 + 𝑥𝑗𝑏)𝑡
𝑝 } (4.20) 
where 𝑎 is a positive scale parameter and p represents the shape of the parameter as the hazard rate 
depends on the value of it. When p is greater than 1 the hazard rate is monotonically increasing 
with time. A less value than p indicates a monotonically decreasing hazard rate with time and when 
p equals 1 the hazard is flat with a constant value of  𝑎 . 
The Weibull model can be parameterized in terms of its covariates by using a linear model for a 
random variable T, 
log(𝑇) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖2 + ⋯ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝜎𝜖 (4.21) 
4.2.1.2.3. Gompertz Model 
This duration model has a hazard function which is an exponential function of the duration 
times. The hazard rate for Gompertz model can be monotonically increasing, decreasing or flat.  
The baseline hazard can be written as  
ℎ𝑜(𝑡) = exp(𝛾𝑡) exp(𝑎). (4.22) 
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The parameter γ is responsible for controlling the shape of the baseline hazard and this can 
be either increasing or decreasing exponentially with time. When the sign of the γ is positive, the 
hazard function will increase with time and a negative γ will decrease the hazard rate with time. 
When the γ equals zero, the hazard rate is equal to the one that is seen on an exponential 
distribution. The Gompertz model is capable of restricting the γ to be strictly positive so that when 
t goes to infinity, the survivor function will exponentially decrease to a nonzero constant. This 
assures that the survivor function reaching zero as t approaches infinity. More traditional use of 
Gompertz method has a tendency to not restrict γ because in survival studies subjects are not 
followed forever and the study usually has a date that it ends.  
When the baseline hazard assumed for the Gompertz model is substituted into the hazard 
model it can be written as 
ℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑗) = exp(𝛾𝑡) exp(𝑎 + 𝑥𝑗 𝑏). (4.23) 
Furthermore, both hazard and survivor functions can be written respectively as 
𝐻(𝑡|𝑥𝑗) = (
1
𝛾⁄ ){exp(𝛾𝑡) − 1}exp (𝑎 + 𝑥𝑗𝑏), (4.24) 
and  
𝑆(𝑡|𝑥𝑗𝑏) = exp [− {exp (𝑎 +  𝑥𝑗𝑏) 𝛾} {exp(𝛾𝑡) − 1}]⁄  (4.25) 
4.2.1.2.4. Log-Normal Regression 
The next two models of Log-Normal and Log-Logistic do not assume monotonic hazard 
rates and allow for nonmonotonic hazard rate.  The two models produce similar results for both 
hazard and survival functions.  In the log-normal model, ln (τ) is known to follow a normal 
distribution. The desirable feature of this distribution is that the nonmonotonic hazard function 
increases and then it decreases. When the model is written, it would not be written in the usual 
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method where the baseline hazard is expressed separately. It will be expressed as an Accelerated 
Failure Time (AFT) formula.  
The log-normal model can be written as an AFT 
𝜏𝑗 = exp (−𝑥𝑗𝑏)𝑡𝑗. (4.26) 
The assumption for the lognormal regression can be written as 
𝜏𝑗 ~ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 (𝜇, 𝜎). (4.27) 
When this assumption is used to express the model for log-normal with previous model 
specifications it can be expressed as 
ln( 𝑡𝑖) = 𝑎 +  𝑥𝑗𝑏 +  𝑢𝑗. (4.28) 
At this point it is no longer a proportional hazard model.  However, the inverted U-shaped for 
log-normal is a good fit for data of repeated nature.  
When 𝑢𝑗  is assumed to follow a normal distribution, the resulting equations can be written as 
𝐸(ln(𝑡𝑗)|𝑥𝑗𝑏) = 𝑎 + 𝑥𝑗b, (4.29) 
𝐸 (𝑡𝑗|𝑥𝑗𝑏) = exp (𝑎 + 𝑥𝑗𝑏 +  
𝜎2
2⁄ , (4.30) 
𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 ( 𝑡𝑗|𝑥𝑗𝑏) = exp( 𝑎 + 𝑥𝑗𝑏). (4.31) 
4.2.1.2.5. Log-Logistic Regression 
The log-logistic distribution is similar to the log-normal distribution, but the ln (τ) is 
assumed to follow a logistic distribution. There are several advantages of the log-logistics 
distribution over the log-normal distribution. One of the advantages of it is that log-logistic 
model has simpler mathematical expressions for both hazards and survivor functions and these 
expressions do not include integrals.  
The two parameters γ and λ determines the distribution, where parameter λ controls the 
scale of the distribution, and parameter γ controls its shape. If the γ is lower than 1, then the hazard 
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function increases to reach a single maximum at 𝑡 = (1 𝜆) (1 𝛾 − 1)⁄
𝛾⁄  and then it will decrease. 
If γ is greater than or equal to 1, then the hazard rate is monotonically decreasing. From the AFT 
formulation it is expressed as  
𝜏𝑗 = exp (−𝑥𝑗𝑏)𝑡𝑗. (4.32) 
For the log-logistic regression it is assumed that 
𝜏𝑗~ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 (𝜆, 𝛾). (4.33) 
When λ is substituted with a for consistency purposes, the log-logistic implies the following 
equation 
ln(𝑡𝑗) = 𝑎 +  𝑥𝑗 +  𝑢𝑗 , (4.34) 
when 𝑢𝑗  assumed to have logistic distribution, the model looks like                              
𝐸{ln(𝑡𝑗)|𝑥𝑗𝑏} = 𝑎 + 𝑥𝑗𝑏. (4.35) 
One important characteristic that differentiates the log-logistic and log-normal from the Weibull 
model is the proportional hazards property that applies for the Weibull model.  
4.2.1.3. Semi-Parametric Model 
As discussed in the previous sections the parametric models yield monotonic hazard rates 
that are more focused on time. If the distribution of the duration time is known, parametric 
models are desired. However, many theories and hypotheses require the study of relationship 
between a dependent variable and the covariates. The form of the distribution is not a major 
concern.  
4.2.1.3.1. The Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
The Cox model, first introduced in 1972, is a method where the covariates can be 
estimated while leaving the duration dependency unspecified. Due to this quality and the 
increased model flexibility, the semi-parametric Cox model is more desirable than the other 
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parametric models. Because of the increased flexibility of the model, it is called as a semi-
parametric model.  
Towe and Lawley (2013) use the foreclosure hazard function method in their paper to 
address reflection problem discussed by previous authors. This study will use a similar method to 
calculate the foreclosure resolved rate. The Cox proportional hazards model when used as a 
regression will use the explanatory variables and give out a hazard function. As for the coefficient 
results, a positive coefficient would indicate the higher chance of the hazard and the negative 
coefficients would indicate the opposite. The Cox method has the ability to produce results by 
using several variables at a time. The hazard function can be defined as the probability of an event 
taking place. 
 Hazard rate for the ith  observation can be written as  
ℎ𝑖 = ℎ0(𝑡) exp(𝛽
′𝑥). (4.36) 
The baseline hazard function is denoted by ℎ0 and covariates and regression parameters are 
denoted by 𝛽′𝑥. Both Weibull and Cox model have a hazard rate that is proportional. Therefore 
the ratio for can be expressed as 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡)
ℎ𝑗(𝑡)
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽′(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗)). (4.37) 
The above equation shows the property of both models having a fixed proportion across time. Even 
though both Weibull and Cox models have a proportional hazard form, Cox model differentiates 
itself by having a baseline hazard rate which is unknown and unparameterized. Thus it is called a 
semi-parametric model.  Since it is unparameterized, the regression model does not have an 
intercept term. In its scalar form the Cox is written as 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = exp (𝛽1𝑥1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖+. . . 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖)ℎ0(𝑡) (4.38) 
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The above equation can be rewritten by using the log of hazard model ratios which gives the 
following equation: 
log {
ℎ(𝑡)
(ℎ0(𝑡)
} = 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖 + ⋯ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖 (4.39) 
With the given properties of the Cox model, this study will use the hazard model to examine the 
rate at which a foreclosed house in a regular housing market can be solved by time t, given that 
the house has not been sold until t. The hazard rate h depends on the housing characteristics C and 
Neighborhood characteristics N: 
ℎ(𝑡, 𝐶, 𝑁) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp (𝛽1𝐶 + 𝛽2 𝑁). (4.40) 
4.2.2. Hedonic Regression 
Hedonic regression is a widely used method in many real estate studies. It gives the ability 
to estimate the value of a property by including many different categories of components. The 
value of a house can depend on many factors such as its characteristics, neighborhood 
characteristics and time of the sale etc. As a result the regression can estimate the impact of each 
and every individual characteristic. For example, it can include many housing characteristics such 
as the number of bedrooms, square footage, living area and more. In economics it is used to reveal 
a consumer’s willingness to pay for a certain good. The characteristics included in the regression 
will reveal how the value of each characteristic will change the dependent variable.  
Consistent with most foreclosure studies done by many authors (Immergluck and Smith 
2006; Harding et al.,2009; Leonard and Murdoch, 2009; Lin et al.,2009; Rogers and Winter 2009; 
Daneshvary) this study will attempt to estimate the impact of housing and neighborhood 
characteristic on sales price of a foreclosed property. So it moves away from the time to resolution 
variable and now takes the natural log of the sales price as the dependent variable.  It is then 
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regressed on housing, neighborhood characteristics, and dummy variables such as school districts, 
year of the foreclosure and the winter dummy variable. The equation can be written as  
ln(𝑃) =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝐶 + 𝛿 𝑁 + 𝛾𝐷 + 𝜀, (4.41) 
where the dependent variable is the natural log of the foreclosed sales price (P), C is a vector of 
housing characteristics, N is a vector of neighborhood characteristics and D represents all the 
dummy variables including house conditions , school districts, foreclosure years and a seasonal 
dummy. 
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1. OLS Regression for Time to Resolution 
The main dependent variable of this study, time to resolution, was regressed against all 
independent variables of housing, neighborhood and dummies to obtain the coefficient values from 
the OLS method. The negative coefficient values show that there is a negative impact on the 
dependent variable. In this case, it means that a negative coefficient will help decrease the time it 
is vacant and help sell the property faster. The positive coefficient values will increase the time 
that it is vacant and not help a property to be sold fast. All the results for OLS regression for time 
to resolution is reported in Table 5.1.  
Housing characteristics such as the number of stories (story1, story 1.5 and story 2) help to 
sell the property faster, once it is foreclosed.  Characteristics such as slab foundation, central heat, 
living area, fireplace and the efficiency age of the house all slow down the process of resolution. 
Only one school district dummy is significant and a property in Highland Park will increase the 
time of the property being vacant by as high as 9 months.  
An increase in the percentage of school children in the neighborhood increases the speed 
of a property being resolved by 2.6 months.  According to the results the percentage of white 
people in a neighborhood increases the time a property is vacant and it is about 2.04 months. All 
the foreclosure year dummy variables are significant and they all help to reduce the time a property 
is vacant. The winter dummy variable is significant at 1% and hinders the sale of a foreclosed 
property by 1.03 months. The OLS regression reports an R-squared of 0.11only. The OLS method 
used here only looks at uncensored data (only the foreclosed properties that were sold). It fails to 
take the censoring nature of the data and the time variant variables into account when estimating 
the model. The results obtained from the Cox proportional hazard model provide a more accurate 
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set of coefficients for the variables and the likelihood of a sale for a  foreclosed property taking 
place, as it has the capacity to account for censoring and time variant data. 
Table 5.1. Coefficients of Time to Resolve OLS Regression 
Time to Resolve OLS- Abridged 
Variable Coefficient 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Constant 22.87205*** 13.58362 32.16048 
  (4.73883)    
Attached Garage -0.195586 -0.8001651 0.4089931 
  (0.3084479)    
Attached Carport 0.1878966 -0.8068828 1.182676 
  (0.5075227)    
Detached Carport 0.2415704 -1.25173 1.734871 
  (0.7618613)    
Pool -0.2184126 -0.935446 0.4986208 
  (0.3658205)    
Slab Foundation 0.8380121** 0.1942272 1.481797 
  (0.3284502)    
Central Heat 1.08114* -0.1589551 2.321235 
  (0.6326794)    
Central Air Conditioning -0.9177252 -2.088417 0.2529668 
  (0.5972709)    
Baths 0.4033117 -0.1059821 0.9126055 
  (0.2598347)    
Lot Area -0.0133282 -0.0351357 0.0084794 
  (0.0111259)    
Living Area 0.5028554** 0.046044 0.9596668 
  (0.2330589)    
Fireplace 0.9281334*** 0.4149545 1.441312 
  (0.2618168)    
1 Story -10.22056*** -17.51133 -2.929782 
  (3.719653)    
1.5 Story -10.04148*** -17.32876 -2.754192 
  (3.717873)    
2 Story -9.723288*** -16.99017 -2.456411 
  (3.707461)    
Effective Age 0.0385671*** 0.0215241 0.0556101 
  (0.0086951)    
Community Percentage of School Aged Children -2.669003* -5.741228 0.4032218 
  (1.567407)    
Community Percentage Over 60 -0.8624788 -4.141775 2.416817 
  (1.673052)    
Community Percentage Below Poverty 1.094134 -0.8716297 3.059898 
  
(1.002906)    
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Table 5.1. Coefficients of Time to Resolve OLS Regression (Continued) 
Time to Resolve OLS- Abridged (continued) 
Variable Coefficient 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Community Percentage White 2.043418*** 0.9669228 3.119913 
  (0.5492129)    
      
Condition Dummy Yes    
School District Dummy Yes    
Seasonal Dummy Yes    
Foreclosure Year Dummy Yes    
      
Number of Observations 22698    
R-squared 0.1189    
Adj R-squared 0.1172    
F-Statistic 69.47     
 
5.2. Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
As discussed in Chapter 4 section 4.2.1.3, the Cox proportional method was used to obtain 
the hazard ratios for housing and neighborhood characteristics. The results are reported with the 
relevant coefficient and hazard ratios in Table 5.2.When interpreting, a hazard ratio above 1 
implies that the independent variable increases the chance of that particular property being 
resolved faster. A hazard ratio below 1 implies that independent variable decreases the chance of 
a particular property being resolved. For example, a hazard ratio of 0.94 for a binary variable 
means that the presence of that characteristic will decrease the chance of a property being resolved 
by 6%. If a continuous variable, such as living area, it can be interpreted as the increase of an 
additional square footage would lead to an increase/decrease in the time to resolution. When 
coefficients are presented, it can easily be converted to its hazard ratio by taking the exponential 
value of the coefficient.  
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5.2.1. Housing Characteristics 
The results from the Cox model for most housing characteristics are significant. 
Characteristics such as an attached garage, a pool, central heat, central air conditioning, amount of 
living area, one story, one and a half stories and two stories are all significant and increase the 
chance of a property being resolved faster. For example, the hazard ratio of 1.0967 for an attached 
garage implies that the presence of an attached garage will increase the likelihood of the house 
being sold by 10%.  Kluger & Miller (1990) use a Cox proportional method for their study to 
observe the sale probability of regular houses in Columbus Ohio by housing characteristics. They 
report how having an extra bedroom can decrease the expected time on market for a property. Even 
though this study will not have a separate bedroom variable, living area and number of bedrooms 
are highly correlated enough that living area captures the bedroom variable details as well. The 
results from the Cox model found that when the living area is increased by 1000 square feet, the 
likelihood of being resolved increases by 12%. But these results cannot be directly compared to 
the results of Kluger & Miller (1990) even though they use a similar methodology.  
Housing characteristics such as attached carport, detached carport, houses with a slab 
foundation, size of the lot, and effective age are all significant, but would hinder the chance of a 
property being sold. Even though lot area decreases the time to resolution, the hazard ratio of it 
only records a value that is less than 1%. In that sense, it only has a minimal impact on the 
dependent variable.  Kluger & Miller (1990) also find that the lot area has a negative impact on 
the time on market for a property. They also find a minimal impact for lot area, which is less than 
1% (the reported coefficient value was -0.000048 and the exponential value of that gives a hazard 
ratio of 0.999952).  However, these values are for general properties that are up for sale and not 
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for foreclosed properties specifically. But their research still helps to understand about desirable 
housing characteristics in the real estate market.  
The results obtained for the variables story 1, story 1.5 and story 2 indicate that they are 
twice as likely to be sold in the market when compared to houses with stories 2.5 and above. The 
hazard ratio of 2.75 for story 1 shows that a house with one story will sell 2.75 faster than the base 
case in the study (story 2.5 and above). As the number of stories increase, the hazard ratio also 
decreases, but this is only a small change. It appears that the number of stories is a major factor 
when deciding to buy a house and especially when it comes to a foreclosed property.  
The hazard ratio of 0.9317 for attached carport implies that the presence of an attached 
carport will decrease the chance of the house being sold by 7%.  The effective age variable implies 
that each additional year added to the property will decrease the chance of that property being 
resolved by less than 1%. Once again, as the value is less than 1% it can be implied that the impact 
would be minimal. It also shows that if a house is newer in age or has been refurbished recently, 
it will likely be resolved faster. 
The condition dummy variable capturing the quality of the house has some interesting 
results. The conditions that are significant are very good, fair and poor. All three conditions help 
to reduce the time to resolution. A house in very good condition will help resolve a property by 
12%, a fair condition by 21% and a poor condition by 15%. Intuitively one would expect above 
average houses to resolve faster than the houses below average would. According to the results, a 
poor conditioned house is likely to be resolved faster than a house in a very good condition. One 
possibility could be the price associated with each condition, where a low quality house would be 
sold at a price that is affordable to a buyer or if a buyer plans to refurbish and sell the house, a low 
quality house may be more desirable. 
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 Towe and Lowley (2013) in their study find evidence of a low quality house increasing 
the hazard of foreclosure by 66%. They also find that both good and very good quality houses are 
less likely to foreclose.  According to this study, properties with fair conditions stand a better 
chance of being resolved. 
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Table 5.2. Cox Proportional Hazard Model Estimates 
 
Cox Proportional Hazard Model - Abridged 
Variable Coefficient Hazard Ratio 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Attached Garage 0.092386*** 1.096788 1.051254 1.144295 
  (0.0237284)     
Attached Carport -0.070677** 0.9317628 0.8693409 0.9986668 
  (0.0329655)     
Detatched Carport -0.3062342*** 0.7362142 0.6625904 0.8180187 
  (0.0395776)     
Pool 0.0667578*** 1.069037 1.016555 1.124227 
  (0.0274563)     
Slab Foundation -0.0974065*** 0.9071872 0.8672384 0.9489761 
  (0.0208448)     
Central Heat 0.1728756*** 1.188718 1.089382 1.297112 
  (0.0529261)     
Central Air Conditioning 0.193649*** 1.21367 1.117157 1.318522 
  (0.0513108)     
Baths -0.0192058 0.9809774 0.9473483 1.0158 
  (0.017459)     
Lot Area -0.0019085** 0.9980934 0.9965213 0.9996679 
  (0.0008027)     
Living Area 0.1141445*** 1.120914 1.087418 1.155442 
  (0.0173508)     
Fireplace 0.0119975 1.01207 0.9761918 1.049266 
  (0.0186378)     
1 Story 1.013217*** 2.754447 1.678482 4.520141 
  (0.6961101)     
1.5 Story 0.9126388*** 2.490887 1.517327 4.08911 
  (0.6299626)     
2 Story 0.8952382*** 2.447919 1.493019 4.01355 
  (0.6175339)     
Effective Age -0.0029136*** 0.9970907 0.9958647 0.9983182 
  (0.0006259)     
Community Percentage of School Aged Children 0.4175565*** 1.518247 1.225541 1.880862 
  (0.1659056)     
Community Percentage Over 60 -0.1956522* 0.8222982 0.6518004 1.037395 
  (0.097488)     
Community Percentage Below Poverty -0.4019829*** 0.6689922 0.5830795 0.7675635 
  (0.0469153)     
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Table 5.2. Cox Proportional Hazard Model Estimates (Continued) 
Cox Proportional Hazard Model - Abridged 
Variable Coefficient Hazard Ratio 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Community Percentage White 0.0405178 1.04135 0.9662476 1.122289 
  (0.0397702)     
       
Condition Dummy Yes     
School District Dummy Yes     
Seasonal Dummy Yes     
Foreclosure Year Dummy Yes     
       
Number of Observations 30581     
Number of Failures 21828     
Log-Likelihood -212569.35       
 
5.2.2. Neighborhood Characteristics 
 The neighborhood characteristics tested for the Cox method are significant with the 
exception of the race variable white. Racial composition still acts as a significant characteristic, 
when buyers make decisions related to purchasing a house. However, this study did not find any 
evidence to support that notion. Both school age and below poverty variables are significant at 1%, 
while the community greater than 60 variable is significant at 10%. The presence of school aged 
children when increased by 1% will increase the chance of resolution by 52%. Both variables of 
community greater than 60 and below poverty decrease the chance of being resolved. 
Most school district dummies used in the study are insignificant except for school district 
5 and 7.  These school districts are Highland Park and Lancaster Independent School District. The 
hazard ratio for both indicates that a foreclosed property in Highland Park and Lancaster 
Independent School District will decrease the chance for resolution by 56% and 32% respectively. 
Foreclosed year dummy variables are all significant and report the chance of resolution by more 
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than 100% when compared to the base year of 2005. The seasonal dummy variable winter indicates 
that most houses foreclosed in winter are likely to be resolved 2% faster.  
5.2.3. Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates 
By using the non-parametric approach, the survival estimates can be obtained. The most 
popular method is the Kaplan- Meier survival estimates. Figure 5.1 displays the Kaplan-Meier 
survival estimates for the foreclosed properties.  
Figure 5.1. Kaplan- Meier Survival Estimate 
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This graph displays the survival curve for the data set and the number of subjects at risk 
for each time period. On the X axis, the time to resolution is displayed in number of months and 
on the Y axis the survivor function is displayed. When t=0, the total number of subjects at risk is 
30, 582. This is number of subjects that face the risk of facing the event of being sold. In the 
beginning the survival rate is 1. At time 1 (t=1), 1474 subjects fail, indicating that they have faced 
the event of being resolved. Therefore at t=1 the survival function can be calculated as 0.9518.  
Given in Table 5.3 is the summary for survival times in periods of 10, and a full table of survival 
functions is attached in the appendix section.  
Table 5.3. Survival Time Estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.4. Nelson-Aalen Cumulative Hazards 
The cumulative hazards are obtained by using a non-parametric method of the Nelson-
Aalen estimator. In non-parametric studies there are no assumptions made and this helps to 
compare how two groups will have different hazard rates. Given below are four graphs for 
variables of pool, central air condition, house with a fair condition and school district 5 (Highland 
Park) showing the cumulative hazard rate for variables used in the study. Both pool 5.2 (a) and 
central air conditioning 5.2 (b) variables show that houses featuring them are more likely to face 
Time Beg. Total Fail Net Lost Survivor Function Std. Error [95% Conf. Int.]
1 30582 1474 0 0.9518 0.0012 0.9493    0.9541
10 15328 700 0 0.4783 0.0029 0.4727    0.4839
20 11965 128 0 0.3871 0.0028 0.3816    0.3925
30 10828 76 93 0.358 0.0027 0.3526    0.3633
40 9321 57 111 0.3372 0.0027 0.3319    0.3426
50 8070 45 126 0.319 0.0027 0.3138    0.3243
60 6652 46 103 0.3014 0.0027 0.2962    0.3067
70 5305 29 50 0.284 0.0027 0.2788    0.2893
80 2557 18 273 0.2644 0.0028 0.2590    0.2698
90 7 0 7 0.245 0.0034 0.2384    0.2517
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the event of being resolved. Cumulatively, there is a big difference over time and one can say that 
pool and central air condition are desirable characteristics for a house in Dallas County, as one 
might imagine. The house characteristic condition 3, which is the fair condition5.2 (c) show that 
over time the likelihood of the event happening is not that far apart. While School district 5, 
Highland Park, shows that a house in that school district is less likely to be resolved when 
compared to a house located in another school district of the county.  
Figure 5.2. Nelson-Aalen Cumulative Hazard Graph for Pool, Central Air Conditioning,    
Condition 3 and School District 5 
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Once the variables are fitted into the Cox proportional model, the graphs can be obtained 
for survival, hazard and cumulative hazard functions. The hazard function in this case, Figure 5.3, 
decreases over time. It decreases until 40 months and increases slightly thereafter. By the time it 
reaches 40 months, the chance of being sold in the market decreases, increases a little bit until it 
reaches 70 months and finally starts to decrease again.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. The Smoothed Hazard Graph from Cox Proportional Hazards Regression 
 
The cumulative hazard graph, Figure 5.4, considers all the hazard ratios for the properties 
and graphs them against time. The graph for cumulative hazards increases at a decreasing rate until 
it reaches the 20 months and thereafter follows a small more consistent increase.  
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Figure 5.4. The Cumulative Cox Proportional Hazards Regression Graph 
 
After fitting the covariates into a Cox model, the cumulative hazard ratios can be obtained. 
For illustrative purposes, the same four variables are used in graphical form to compare the 
cumulative hazard ratios before and after fitting the covariates into the model. These graphs can 
be seen in Figure 5.5. The previous cumulative graphs for covariates (Figure 5.4) were estimated 
on raw data and using a non-parametric method.  
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Figure 5.5. Cox Proportional Hazards Cumulative Graphs for Variables Pool, Central Air 
Conditioning, Condition 3 and School District 5 
 
The cumulative hazard ratio for the variable pool, over time does not have as large a gap 
as shown in the Nelson- Aalen graph before. Until 10 months, the house without a pool stands 
about an equal chance of being resolved, however after that time period houses with a pool are 
likely to resolve faster. Looking at the central air conditioning variable, it is indicated that a house 
with that variable is preferred over a house without. Cumulatively, this difference starts at an early 
time period and continues to maintain the gap. A house in fair condition is more likely to be 
resolved faster. The effect is large, especially when compared with the corresponding Nelson- 
Aalen graph for the variable. Cumulatively, a house in a fair condition is likely to be resolved 
57 
 
faster than any other house condition. It once again starts at an early stage and increases over time. 
The largest effect can be seen by school district 5, Highland Park.  A property located in this school 
district is less likely to be resolved and the difference between the two curves increases over time.  
5.2.4. Assessing the Goodness of Fit for Cox Proportional Methods 
A Cox-Snell residual is the difference between the observed data point and the predicted 
value. The Cox-Snell equals the negative of the log of the survival time, written as: -log S(ti).  The 
Kaplan-Meier estimator is computed on the Cox-Snell residuals and from those estimates the 
integrated hazards are estimated. If the plot of the integrated hazard against the hazard rate 
estimates falls along a 45˚ line meaning that the distribution of the Cox-Snell is exponential and 
then the model is a good fit. Figure5.6 shows the Cox-Snell residual for the model used for this 
study. Looking at the graph, the model seems to be a good fit for most parts where towards the end 
it moves away from the reference line.  
 Figure 5.6. Cox-Snell Residual 
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5.3. Hedonic Pricing Model 
5.3.1. Housing Characteristics 
Results obtained from the OLS regression method for sales prices show some interesting 
results. Most housing characteristics are significant with the exception of attached carport, 
detached carport, lot area, and the number of the stories in the house. The presence of 
characteristics such as attached garage, pool, central heat, central ac, baths, living area and fire 
place all are positively significant in determining the sales price of the property. The increase of 
1000 square footage in the living area contributes to a 33% increase in the price. The study found 
that properties with a slab foundation will have a decreased sales price by 10%. Efficiency age of 
the property increase can also negatively affect the sales price of the foreclosed property. The 
number of stories in a house is not significant for all three levels tested out in the study. In other 
words, whether a house has more than one story or not doesn’t have any impact on the sales price 
of a foreclosed property. 
Table 5.4. Results for Hedonic Regression (OLS) 
Natural Log of Sales Price OLS- Abridged 
Variable Coefficient 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Constant 10.2362*** 10.02643 10.44596 
  (0.1070189)    
Attached Garage 0.0344818*** 0.0208283 0.0481353 
  (0.0069658)    
Attached Carport -0.010945 -0.033411 0.0115205 
  (0.0114616)    
Detached Carport 0.0261764 -0.007547 0.0599002 
  (0.0172054)    
Pool 0.0667078*** 0.0505147 0.0829008 
  (0.0082615)    
Slab Foundation -0.1041215*** -0.11866 -0.0895826 
  (0.0074175)    
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Table 5.4. Results for Hedonic Regression (OLS) (Continued) 
Natural Log of Sales Price OLS- Abridged (Continued) 
Variable Coefficient 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Central Heat 0.0751414*** 0.0471359 0.103147 
  (0.0142881)    
Central Air Conditioning 0.1696838*** 0.1432456 0.196122 
  (0.0134884)    
Baths 0.0636866*** 0.052185 0.0751882 
  (0.005868)    
Lot Area 0.0003434 -0.000149 0.0008359 
  (0.0002513)    
Living Area 0.3315146*** 0.3211982 0.341831 
  (0.0052633)    
Fireplace 0.1258583*** 0.114269 0.1374476 
  (0.0059127)    
1 Story 0.0334408 -0.13121 0.1980913 
  (0.0840024)    
1.5 Story -0.0035174 -0.168089 0.1610544 
  (0.0839622)    
2 Story -0.0157234 -0.179834 0.1483874 
  (0.0837271)    
Effective Age -0.0045981*** -0.004983 -0.0042132 
  (0.0001964)    
Community Percentage of School Aged Children 0.2073673*** 0.137986 0.2767486 
  (0.0353974)    
Community Percentage Over 60 -0.7615106*** -0.835568 -0.6874529 
  (0.0377832)    
Community Percentage Below Poverty -0.526034*** -0.570428 -0.4816404 
  (0.022649)    
Community Percentage White 0.6305285*** 0.6062176 0.6548395 
  (0.0124031)    
      
Condition Dummy Yes    
School District Dummy Yes    
Seasonal Dummy Yes    
Foreclosure Year Dummy Yes    
      
Number of observations 22698    
R-squared 0.7391    
Adj R-squared 0.7386    
F Statistic 1458.65     
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5.3.2. Neighborhood Characteristics 
All neighborhood characteristics are significant with both positive and negative impacts as 
seen in Table 5.2. The increase of the white percentage in the neighborhood would lead to a price 
increase of by 0.63%. In real estate literature there is evidence that racial composition has an 
impact on the price of a house (Kim, 2008). It is widely believed that neighborhoods composed 
with high white percentages have higher house prices when compared to house prices from non-
white neighborhoods. The result in this study shows the role of racial composition in determining 
house prices for foreclosed properties as well.  
The percentage increase in school aged children in the neighborhood would increase the 
prices by 0.2%. Intuitively one can expect a negative relationship between sales prices and poverty. 
As expected the increase of below poverty percentage would lead to a decrease of 0.5%. Also the 
percentage of people who are above 60 in the community can also have a negative impact on the 
prices by 0.76%. While these values may seem low, they still indicate that these characteristics 
have a role to play when determining the prices and it can be a positive or negative relationship.   
The house condition dummy variables clearly show a direct relationship with the sale price. 
All dummy variables for this are significant with positive relationships. A house in an excellent, 
good, average or poor would have an impact of 38%, 30%, 24% or 13% respectively.  When 
determining the sales price, the condition of the property has a great influence.  
Out of the 13 school districts dummies tested out to control for any geographical effects, 7 
of the districts are significant. School district of Highland Park has a 78% impact on the sales price. 
This is the highest impact that is seen among all the other significant school districts. This estimate 
could be a result of some preferences from the buyers’ side capturing some geographical and other 
local trends. Highland Park is also one of the two school districts that has the exemplary rating.  
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The location of the property in both Lancaster ISD and Mesquite ISD both lead to a decrease in 
the sales price by 16%. Lancaster is an academically acceptable school district and Mesquite is a 
recognized school district according to the rates given to each of the school districts.  
In real estate markets, seasonality tends to play an important role. The study finds that a 
house foreclosed in winter seasons will increase the house price by 0.8%. Most winter listings have 
a tendency to be sold by spring and summer season. There is a general tendency to look for a house 
in the spring or summer season than in the fall or winter seasons. This could be the reason why the 
prices of foreclosed properties have a positive impact with the seasonality.  In order to determine 
whether the year of the foreclosure plays a role on the sale price, the study included five foreclosure 
year dummy variables and they all are significant. All years from 2006-2010 show evidence of 
having a negative impact on the sale price. For a house foreclosed in year 2006 the impact is a 
negative 0.5% and it increases up to a negative 21% in 2008. The houses foreclosed in 2010 the 
impact is 22%. The higher decrease in the price for years 2008-2010 could reflect the market 
conditions prevailed at that time.   
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
The main purpose of this study was to determine whether housing and neighborhood 
characteristics have an impact on the sale of foreclosed properties, and if it holds true to identify 
the desirable characteristics that help resolve a property faster. For this Dallas County, Texas data 
was used from the years 2005- 2010. The data included a list of foreclosures, sale prices, housing 
characteristics and neighborhood characteristics. The time varying nature of data weakens the 
results obtained by traditional methods such as OLS. This is where survival methods can help 
accompany time variant covariates. Cox proportional hazard method allows the inclusion of time 
varying covariates yet does not impose any assumptions on the shape of the baseline hazard. 
Therefore, it allows the baseline hazard to take any shape and yet calculate the impact of covariates 
on the base line hazard rate.  
The low R-squared of 0.1189 reported by the OLS regression for the dependent variable of 
time to resolution, proved the chosen method is not adequate and it only takes uncensored data 
into account. When the dependent variable time to resolution was used in the Cox model, housing 
characteristics such as attached garage, pool, central heat, central air conditioning, living area, fair 
house condition and stories from 1- 2 are all highly significant and help to sell a foreclosed property 
faster. On the other hand, housing characteristics such as detached carport, houses with a slab 
foundation and the efficiency age of the house are highly significant factors that hinder the chances 
of a foreclosed property being sold.  
Neighborhood characteristics such as the percentage of school aged children in the 
neighborhood and the percentage of people who are below the poverty line are all highly 
significant with two different impacts on the resolution rate; where the school age variable helps 
to resolve a property faster and below poverty slows down the sale of a foreclosed property. There 
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was no evidence to support the idea of buyers placing value on the racial composition in the 
neighborhood.  
The results from hedonic regression for identifying characteristics that have an impact on 
the sale price of foreclosed properties show that characteristics such as attached garage, pool, 
central heat, central air conditioning, the number of bathrooms, living area, and the condition of 
the house are highly significant and have a positive impact on the sales price. The variable slab is 
highly significant, but it has a negative impact on the sales price. The results also reveal how 
neighborhood characteristics have both negative and positive impacts on the sales price of a 
foreclosed property.  
6.1. Limitations 
This study sheds light on the speed of a sale of a foreclosed property and the characteristics 
that impact it. However, there are limitations associated with the study and identifying them may 
help future studies. First and foremost, the data collected for this study is county level and comes 
from one of the counties in Texas.  Texas is the second largest economy in the United States and 
during the financial crisis the impact of it on the state was minimal; especially in the housing 
market. As a result of a more stable economy and a less volatile housing market, there exists a 
chance of the observed foreclosure activity level in the state could be less than what was observed 
from other states.   
The dependent variable used in the hedonic regression can be considered as a choice 
variable and it can only be observed when the property is foreclosed. Therefore, both housing and 
neighborhood characteristics used are the determinants when evaluating the price of a foreclosed 
house. One of the major limitations of a hedonic model is determining the variables that need to 
be included in the model. Even though it helps to include a wide variety of variables representing 
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the most functional form of a house, there could be other types of variables that are not included 
in the model that may or may not add be preferred by buyers in Dallas County.  
6.2. Need for Future Study 
In the future, it would be beneficial if a study could be done with more county level data 
and find whether there are similarities across counties. Housing markets are heterogeneous and 
can have local differences, but a study done on different counties for the same state can help 
understand whether there are characteristics that are valued in general more than others. Another 
area that can be explored is comparing housing and neighborhood characteristics for both 
distressed and non-distressed properties for a single market. This would provide evidence that 
buyers may have different preferences depending on the status of the house.  
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APPENDIX  
Table A.1. Summary Statistics 
  
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
cond1 Unsound 31452 0.0153249 0.1228437 0 1 
cond2 Poor 31452 0.0469922 0.2116256 0 1 
cond3 Fair 31452 0.1375747 0.3444585 0 1 
cond4 Average  31452 0.243196 0.4290193 0 1 
cond5 Good 31452 0.2386176 0.4262452 0 1 
cond6 Very good 31452 0.1715312 0.3769785 0 1 
cond7 Excellent 31452 0.1467633 0.3538754 0 1 
sd1 Carrolton Farmers branch ISD 31452 0.0257853 0.1584968 0 1 
sd2 Dallas ISD 31452 0.337403 0.4728312 0 1 
sd3 Cedar Hill ISD 31452 0.0574208 0.2326487 0 1 
sd4 Garland ISD 31452 0.1581457 0.3648834 0 1 
sd5 Highland Park ISD 31452 0.0017487 0.0417815 0 1 
sd6 Irvin ISD 31452 0.0411421 0.1986219 0 1 
sd7 Lancaster ISD 31452 0.0440989 0.2053182 0 1 
sd8 Mesquite ISD 31452 0.1142694 0.3181432 0 1 
sd9 Coppell ISD 31452 0.0077896 0.087916 0 1 
sd10 Grand Prairi ISD 31452 0.0601552 0.2377779 0 1 
sd11 Richardson ISD 31452 0.0427 0.2021831 0 1 
sd12 Desoto ISD 31452 0.0606321 0.238658 0 1 
sd13 Duncanville 31452 0.0474692 0.2126435 0 1 
y06 House foreclosed in 2006 31452 0.2401755 0.4271967 0 1 
y07 House foreclosed in 2007 31452 0.20978 0.407158 0 1 
y08 House foreclosed in 2008 31452 0.1883505 0.390998 0 1 
y09 House foreclosed in 2009 31452 0.124698 0.3303814 0 1 
y10 House foreclosed in 2010 31452 0.0347514 0.1831523 0 1 
69 
 
Table A.2. Time to Resolution Estimates 
Time to Resolution OLS 
Variable Coefficient 95% Confidence Interval 
Constant 22.87205*** 13.58362 32.16048 
 (4.73883)   
Attached Garage -0.195586 -0.8001651 0.4089931 
 (0.3084479)   
Attached Carport 0.1878966 -0.8068828 1.182676 
 (0.5075227)   
Detatched Carport 0.2415704 -1.25173 1.734871 
 (0.7618613)   
Pool -0.2184126 -0.935446 0.4986208 
 (0.3658205)   
Slab Foundation 0.8380121** 0.1942272 1.481797 
 (0.3284502)   
Central Heat 1.08114* -0.1589551 2.321235 
 (0.6326794)   
Central Air Conditioning -0.9177252 -2.088417 0.2529668 
 (0.5972709)   
Baths 0.4033117 -0.1059821 0.9126055 
 (0.2598347)   
Lot Area -0.0133282 -0.0351357 0.0084794 
 (0.0111259)   
Living Area 0.5028554** 0.046044 0.9596668 
 (0.2330589)   
Fireplace 0.9281334*** 0.4149545 1.441312 
 (0.2618168)   
Condition 7- 0.2541659 -1.462183 1.970515 
 (0.8756577)   
Condition 6- 0.053073 -1.63739 1.743536 
 (0.8624511)   
Condition 5- 0.3019233 -1.367375 1.971222 
 (0.8516532)   
Condition 4- -0.3711085 -2.029778 1.28756 
 (0.84623)   
Condition 3- -1.382133 -3.061999 0.2977341 
 (0.8570448)   
Condition 2- -0.687402 -2.504818 1.130014 
 (0.9272208)   
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Table A.2. Time to Resolution Estimates (Continued) 
Time to Resolution OLS 
Variable Coefficient 95% Confidence Interval 
School District 1 1.514121 -3.714541 6.742783 
 (2.667591)   
School District 2 2.656278 -2.465733 7.77829 
 (2.61318)   
School District 3 2.758352 -2.387379 7.904083 
 (2.625281)   
School District 4 1.617617 -3.499414 6.734647 
 (2.610638)   
School District 5 9.179798** 2.035482 16.32411 
 (3.644931)   
School District 6 2.994477 -2.195679 8.184633 
 (2.647946)   
School District 7 3.161479 -2.030428 8.353387 
 (2.64884)   
School District 8 1.569744 -3.561461 6.700948 
 (2.61787)   
School District 9 1.152906 -4.373047 6.678859 
 (2.819265)   
School District 10 1.139234 -4.017629 6.296096 
 (2.63096)   
School District 11 1.903445 -3.280611 7.087501 
 (2.644834)   
School District 12 2.878851 -2.270956 8.028659 
 (2.627361)   
School District 13 2.280766 -2.889151 7.450683 
 (2.63762)   
1 Story -10.22056*** -17.51133 -2.929782 
 (3.719653)   
1.5 Story -10.04148*** -17.32876 -2.754192 
 (3.717873)   
2 Story -9.723288*** -16.99017 -2.456411 
 (3.707461)   
Effective Age 0.0385671*** 0.0215241 0.0556101 
 (0.0086951)   
  
71 
 
Table A.2. Time to Resolution Estimates (Continued) 
 
 
  
Time to Resolution OLS 
Variable Coefficient 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Community Percentage of School Aged Children -2.669003* -5.741228 0.4032218 
 (1.567407)   
Community Percentage Over 60 -0.8624788 -4.141775 2.416817 
 (1.673052)   
Community Percentage Below Poverty 
1.094134 
-
0.8716297 
3.059898 
 (1.002906)   
Community Percentage White 2.043418*** 0.9669228 3.119913 
 (0.5492129)   
Year- 2006 -4.238269*** -4.866779 -3.60976 
 (0.320657)   
Year- 2007 -9.669744*** -10.29048 -9.049008 
 (0.3166909)   
Year- 2008 -12.93591*** -13.55943 -12.31239 
 (0.3181111)   
Year- 2009 -14.40998*** -15.11611 -13.70385 
 (0.3602562)   
Year- 2010 -14.32407*** -15.46611 -13.18203 
 (0.5826547)   
Season- Winter 1.031417*** 0.5882003 1.474633 
 (0.2261228)   
    
Number of Observations 22698   
R-squared 0.1189   
Adj R-squared 0.1172   
F-Statistic 69.47   
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Table A.3. Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates and Ratios 
 
 
 
Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
Variable Coefficient Hazard Ratio 95% Confidence Interval 
Attached Garage 0.092386*** 1.096788 1.051254 1.144295 
  (0.0237284)     
Attached Carport -0.070677** 0.9317628 0.8693409 0.9986668 
  (0.0329655)     
Detatched Carport -0.3062342*** 0.7362142 0.6625904 0.8180187 
  (0.0395776)     
Pool 0.0667578*** 1.069037 1.016555 1.124227 
  (0.0274563)     
Slab Foundation -0.0974065*** 0.9071872 0.8672384 0.9489761 
  (0.0208448)     
Central Heat 0.1728756*** 1.188718 1.089382 1.297112 
  (0.0529261)     
Central Air Conditioning 0.193649*** 1.21367 1.117157 1.318522 
  (0.0513108)     
Baths -0.0192058 0.9809774 0.9473483 1.0158 
  (0.017459)     
Lot Area -0.0019085** 0.9980934 0.9965213 0.9996679 
  (0.0008027)     
Living Area 0.1141445*** 1.120914 1.087418 1.155442 
  (0.0173508)     
Fireplace 0.0119975 1.01207 0.9761918 1.049266 
  (0.0186378)     
Condition 7- 0.0521213 1.053504 0.9353784 1.186546 
  (0.0639238)     
Condition 6- 0.1168896** 1.123995 1.000047 1.263306 
  (0.0670064)     
Condition 5- 0.0186648 1.01884 0.9079143 1.143318 
  (0.0599204)     
Condition 4- 0.0242434 1.02454 0.9135087 1.149066 
  (0.0599606)     
Condition 3- 0.1932727*** 1.213214 1.079948 1.362924 
  (0.0720265)     
Condition 2- 0.142168** 1.15277 1.016323 1.307537 
  (0.0740945)       
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Table A.3. Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates and Ratios (Continued) 
 
Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
Variable Coefficient Hazard Ratio 95% Confidence Interval 
School District 1 -0.0957789 0.9086649 0.634183 1.301946 
  (0.1667332)     
School District 2 -0.1920187 0.8252914 0.5804401 1.17343 
  (0.1481972)     
School District 3 -0.2526254 0.7767588 0.545424 1.106211 
  (0.1401229)     
School District 4 -0.0995105 0.9052805 0.6369098 1.286733 
  (0.1624069)     
School District 5 -0.8163302*** 0.4420509 0.2700977 0.7234753 
  (0.1111105)     
School District 6 -0.1958596 0.8221276 0.5754886 1.174469 
  (0.1496116)     
School District 7 -0.3790782** 0.6844921 0.4790344 0.9780705 
  (0.1246444)     
School District 8 -0.1834367 0.8324046 0.585058 1.184323 
  (0.1497539)     
School District 9 -0.2646126 0.7675032 0.5239813 1.124203 
  (0.1494648)     
School District 10 -0.1898964 0.8270448 0.5801497 1.179011 
  (0.1496188)     
School District 11 -0.2943624 0.7450065 0.5216526 1.063993 
  (0.1354687)     
School District 12 -0.2247423 0.798722 0.5606764 1.137834 
  (0.1442082)     
School District 13 -0.2733504 0.7608261 0.5332649 1.085495 
  (0.1379553)     
1 Story 1.013217*** 2.754447 1.678482 4.520141 
  (0.6961101)     
1.5 Story 0.9126388*** 2.490887 1.517327 4.08911 
  (0.6299626)     
2 Story 0.8952382*** 2.447919 1.493019 4.01355 
  (0.6175339)     
Effective Age -0.0029136*** 0.9970907 0.9958647 0.9983182 
  (0.0006259)       
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Table A.3. Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates and Ratios (Continued) 
Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
Variable Coefficient 
Hazard 
Ratio 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Neighborhood Percentage of School Aged 
Children 0.4175565*** 1.518247 1.225541 1.880862 
  (0.1659056)     
Neighborhood Percentage Over 60 -0.1956522* 0.8222982 0.6518004 1.037395 
  (0.097488)     
Neighborhood Percentage Below Poverty -0.4019829*** 0.6689922 0.5830795 0.7675635 
  (0.0469153)     
Neighborhood Percentage White 0.0405178 1.04135 0.9662476 1.122289 
  (0.0397702)     
Year- 2006 0.1663004*** 1.180928 1.130167 1.233968 
  (0.0264717)     
Year- 2007 0.7335215*** 2.082401 1.993357 2.175422 
  (0.0464312)     
Year- 2008 0.9385969*** 2.556392 2.444385 2.673532 
  (0.0584374)     
Year- 2009 0.815602*** 2.260536 2.147193 2.379863 
  (0.0593295)     
Year- 2010 0.7640252*** 2.146901 1.978423 2.329725 
  (0.0895199)     
Season- Winter 0.0264968* 1.026851 0.9954982 1.059191 
  (0.0162459)     
       
Number of Observations 30581     
Number of Failures 21828     
Log-Likelihood -212569.35       
 
  
75 
 
Table A.4. Kaplan-Meier Survival Statistics 
Kaplan-Meier Survivor Function  
Time Beg. Total Fail Net Lost Survivor Function Std. Error [95% Conf. Int.] 
1 30582 1474 0 0.9518 0.0012 0.9493    0.9541 
2 29108 2007 0 0.8862 0.0018 0.8826    0.8897 
3 27101 2252 0 0.8125 0.0022 0.8081    0.8169 
4 24849 2315 0 0.7368 0.0025 0.7319    0.7417 
5 22534 2049 0 0.6698 0.0027 0.6645    0.6751 
6 20485 1700 0 0.6143 0.0028 0.6088    0.6197 
7 18785 1432 0 0.5674 0.0028 0.5619    0.5730 
8 17353 1130 0 0.5305 0.0029 0.5249    0.5361 
9 16223 895 0 0.5012 0.0029 0.4956    0.5068 
10 15328 700 0 0.4783 0.0029 0.4727    0.4839 
11 14628 571 0 0.4596 0.0028 0.4541    0.4652 
12 14057 441 0 0.4452 0.0028 0.4397    0.4508 
13 13616 367 0 0.4332 0.0028 0.4277    0.4388 
14 13249 298 0 0.4235 0.0028 0.4179    0.4290 
15 12951 265 0 0.4148 0.0028 0.4093    0.4203 
16 12686 221 0 0.4076 0.0028 0.4021    0.4131 
17 12465 204 0 0.4009 0.0028 0.3954    0.4064 
18 12261 158 0 0.3958 0.0028 0.3903    0.4012 
19 12103 138 0 0.3912 0.0028 0.3858    0.3967 
20 11965 128 0 0.3871 0.0028 0.3816    0.3925 
21 11837 101 0 0.3838 0.0028 0.3783    0.3892 
22 11736 86 0 0.3809 0.0028 0.3755    0.3864 
23 11650 101 0 0.3776 0.0028 0.3722    0.3831 
24 11549 91 0 0.3747 0.0028 0.3692    0.3801 
25 11458 102 0 0.3713 0.0028 0.3659    0.3767 
26 11356 90 0 0.3684 0.0028 0.3630    0.3738 
27 11266 88 0 0.3655 0.0028 0.3601    0.3709 
28 11178 77 88 0.363 0.0027 0.3576    0.3684 
29 11013 76 109 0.3605 0.0027 0.3551    0.3659 
30 10828 76 93 0.358 0.0027 0.3526    0.3633 
31 10659 73 114 0.3555 0.0027 0.3501    0.3609 
32 10472 61 75 0.3534 0.0027 0.3481    0.3588 
33 10336 57 90 0.3515 0.0027 0.3461    0.3568 
34 10189 51 181 0.3497 0.0027 0.3444    0.3551 
35 9957 54 21 0.3478 0.0027 0.3425    0.3532 
36 9882 56 137 0.3459 0.0027 0.3405    0.3512 
37 9689 62 80 0.3436 0.0027 0.3383    0.3490 
38 9547 63 12 0.3414 0.0027 0.3361    0.3467 
39 9472 57 94 0.3393 0.0027 0.3340    0.3446 
40 9321 57 111 0.3372 0.0027 0.3319    0.3426 
41 9153 56 19 0.3352 0.0027 0.3299    0.3405 
42 9078 56 79 0.3331 0.0027 0.3278    0.3384 
43 8943 56 101 0.331 0.0027 0.3257    0.3363 
44 8786 51 112 0.3291 0.0027 0.3238    0.3344 
45 8623 52 61 0.3271 0.0027 0.3218    0.3324 
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Table A.4. Kaplan-Meier Survival Statistics (Continued) 
 
  Kaplan-Meier Survivor Function  
Time Beg. Total Fail 
Net 
Lost Survivor Function Std. Error [95% Conf. Int.] 
46 8510 34 49 0.3258 0.0027 0.3205    0.3311 
47 8427 41 85 0.3242 0.0027 0.3190    0.3295 
48 8301 43 53 0.3226 0.0027 0.3173    0.3278 
49 8205 44 91 0.3208 0.0027 0.3156    0.3261 
50 8070 45 126 0.319 0.0027 0.3138    0.3243 
51 7899 35 118 0.3176 0.0027 0.3124    0.3229 
52 7746 37 61 0.3161 0.0027 0.3108    0.3214 
53 7648 42 111 0.3144 0.0027 0.3091    0.3196 
54 7495 48 105 0.3124 0.0027 0.3071    0.3176 
55 7342 31 102 0.311 0.0027 0.3058    0.3163 
56 7209 45 78 0.3091 0.0027 0.3038    0.3144 
57 7086 48 72 0.307 0.0027 0.3018    0.3123 
58 6966 33 151 0.3055 0.0027 0.3003    0.3108 
59 6782 45 85 0.3035 0.0027 0.2983    0.3088 
60 6652 46 103 0.3014 0.0027 0.2962    0.3067 
61 6503 45 82 0.2993 0.0027 0.2941    0.3046 
62 6376 33 176 0.2978 0.0027 0.2925    0.3030 
63 6167 28 108 0.2964 0.0027 0.2912    0.3017 
64 6031 46 221 0.2942 0.0027 0.2889    0.2994 
65 5764 33 41 0.2925 0.0027 0.2872    0.2977 
66 5690 26 55 0.2912 0.0027 0.2859    0.2964 
67 5609 37 99 0.2892 0.0027 0.2840    0.2945 
68 5473 28 88 0.2878 0.0027 0.2825    0.2930 
69 5357 40 12 0.2856 0.0027 0.2804    0.2909 
70 5305 29 50 0.284 0.0027 0.2788    0.2893 
71 5226 37 62 0.282 0.0027 0.2768    0.2873 
72 5127 27 158 0.2805 0.0027 0.2753    0.2858 
73 4942 34 491 0.2786 0.0027 0.2734    0.2839 
74 4417 25 285 0.277 0.0027 0.2718    0.2823 
75 4107 32 245 0.2749 0.0027 0.2696    0.2802 
76 3830 24 197 0.2732 0.0027 0.2679    0.2785 
77 3609 27 344 0.2711 0.0027 0.2658    0.2764 
78 3238 31 605 0.2685 0.0027 0.2632    0.2739 
79 2602 22 23 0.2662 0.0027 0.2609    0.2716 
80 2557 18 273 0.2644 0.0028 0.2590    0.2698 
81 2266 17 321 0.2624 0.0028 0.2570    0.2679 
82 1928 13 2 0.2606 0.0028 0.2551    0.2661 
83 1913 9 294 0.2594 0.0028 0.2539    0.2649 
84 1610 12 214 0.2575 0.0029 0.2519    0.2631 
85 1384 14 219 0.2549 0.0029 0.2492    0.2606 
86 1151 10 329 0.2526 0.003 0.2468    0.2585 
87 812 12 228 0.2489 0.0031 0.2428    0.2550 
88 572 7 275 0.2459 0.0033 0.2395    0.2523 
89 290 1 282 0.245 0.0034 0.2384    0.2517 
90 7 0 7 0.245 0.0034 0.2384    0.2517 
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Figure A.1. Hazard Graphs 
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Figure A.1. Hazard Graphs (Continued) 
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Table A.5. Hedonic Model Estimates 
Natural Log of Sales Price OLS 
Variable Coefficient 95% Confidence Interval 
Constant 10.2362*** 10.02643 10.44596 
  (0.1070189)    
Attached Garage 0.0344818*** 0.0208283 0.0481353 
  (0.0069658)    
Attached Carport -0.010945 -0.0334105 0.0115205 
  (0.0114616)    
Detatched Carport 0.0261764 -0.0075474 0.0599002 
  (0.0172054)    
Pool 0.0667078*** 0.0505147 0.0829008 
  (0.0082615)    
Slab Foundation -0.1041215*** -0.1186603 -0.0895826 
  (0.0074175)    
Central Heat 0.0751414*** 0.0471359 0.103147 
  (0.0142881)    
Central Air Conditioning 0.1696838*** 0.1432456 0.196122 
  (0.0134884)    
Baths 0.0636866*** 0.052185 0.0751882 
  (0.005868)    
Lot Area 0.0003434 -0.000149 0.0008359 
  (0.0002513)    
Living Area 0.3315146*** 0.3211982 0.341831 
  (0.0052633)    
Fireplace 0.1258583*** 0.114269 0.1374476 
  (0.0059127)    
Condition 7- 0.3806472*** 0.3418862 0.4194082 
  (0.0197753)    
Condition 6- 0.3609221*** 0.3227457 0.3990986 
  (0.0194771)    
Condition 5- 0.3020336*** 0.2643351 0.339732 
  (0.0192332)    
Condition 4- 0.2482623*** 0.2108039 0.2857207 
  (0.0191108)    
Condition 3- 0.2008731*** 0.162936 0.2388102 
  (0.019355)    
Condition 2- 0.127279*** 0.0862355 0.1683224 
  (0.0209398)     
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Table A.5. Hedonic Model Estimates (Continued) 
Natural Log of Sales Price OLS 
Variable Coefficient 95% Confidence Interval 
School District 1 0.1527971** 0.0347161 0.2708781 
  (0.0602433)    
School District 2 0.0190371 -0.0966354 0.1347095 
  (0.0590145)    
School District 3 -0.0841696 -0.2003777 0.0320385 
  (0.0592878)    
School District 4 -0.0423482 -0.1579082 0.0732117 
  (0.0589571)    
School District 5 0.7812978*** 0.6199548 0.9426407 
  (0.082315)    
School District 6 0.1119157* -0.0052957 0.2291271 
  (0.0597996)    
School District 7 -0.1670927*** -0.2843436 -0.0498418 
  (0.0598198)    
School District 8 -0.1613277*** -0.2772078 -0.0454477 
  (0.0591204)    
School District 9 0.1776445*** 0.0528497 0.3024393 
  (0.0636686)    
School District 10 -0.0625453 -0.1790047 0.0539142 
  (0.059416)    
School District 11 0.101973* -0.0151006 0.2190467 
  (0.0597293)    
School District 12 -0.069103 -0.1854032 0.0471972 
  (0.0593347)    
School District 13 -0.0655489 -0.1823032 0.0512054 
  (0.0595664)    
1 Story 0.0334408 -0.1312097 0.1980913 
  (0.0840024)    
1.5 Story -0.0035174 -0.1680891 0.1610544 
  (0.0839622)    
2 Story -0.0157234 -0.1798342 0.1483874 
  (0.0837271)    
Effective Age -0.0045981*** -0.0049829 -0.0042132 
  (0.0001964)     
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Table A.5. Hedonic Model Estimates (Continued) 
Natural Log of Sales Price OLS 
Variable Coefficient 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Neighborhood Percentage of School Aged Children 0.2073673*** 0.137986 0.2767486 
  (0.0353974)    
Neighborhood Percentage Over 60 -0.7615106*** -0.8355682 -0.6874529 
  (0.0377832)    
Neighborhood Percentage Below Poverty -0.526034*** -0.5704277 -0.4816404 
  (0.022649)    
Neighborhood Percentage White 0.6305285*** 0.6062176 0.6548395 
  (0.0124031)    
Year- 2006 -0.0056909 -0.0198848 0.0085029 
  (0.0072415)    
Year- 2007 -0.055953*** -0.0699713 -0.0419347 
  (0.007152)    
Year- 2008 -0.2103005*** -0.2243817 -0.1962193 
  (0.007184)    
Year- 2009 -0.209571*** -0.2255177 -0.1936242 
  (0.0081358)    
Year- 2010 -0.2263275*** -0.2521187 -0.2005363 
  (0.0131583)    
Season- Winter 0.0086093* -0.0014001 0.0186186 
  (0.0051066)    
      
Number of observations 22698    
R-squared 0.7391    
Adj R-squared 0.7386    
F Statistic 1458.65     
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Table A.6. Correlation Matrix 
 atgarg atcp pool dtcp slab centra~t centra~c baths lotarea 
atgarg 1         
atcp -0.2811 1        
pool 0.0421 -0.0036 1       
dtcp -0.2233 -0.0272 -0.0102 1      
slab 0.4283 -0.102 0.0567 -0.0967 1     
centralheat 0.3378 -0.0733 0.0787 -0.0548 0.4022 1    
centralac 0.3471 -0.0772 0.0877 -0.0488 0.4219 0.7997 1   
baths 0.3224 -0.0949 0.2476 -0.036 0.3249 0.3537 0.3845 1  
lotarea -0.0309 0.0262 0.127 0.021 -0.0871 -0.0267 -0.0181 0.1716 1 
livarea 0.2324 -0.0748 0.2624 -0.0296 0.1981 0.2452 0.27 0.8016 0.2501 
fireplace 0.3089 -0.1012 0.1705 -0.0411 0.3664 0.3082 0.3529 0.4767 0.0527 
cond7 0.1634 -0.0626 -0.027 -0.047 0.172 0.1136 0.1265 0.2231 0.019 
cond6 0.0852 -0.0306 0.0176 -0.0144 0.0939 0.0986 0.1092 0.0769 -0.0058 
cond5 0.0471 -0.0111 0.0252 -0.012 0.0524 0.0804 0.088 0.0355 -0.0145 
cond4 -0.1068 0.041 -0.0081 0.038 -0.1331 -0.1118 -0.127 -0.1505 -0.0012 
cond3 -0.1126 0.0342 -0.0028 0.0305 -0.1079 -0.1002 -0.1128 -0.1021 -0.0012 
cond2 -0.0819 0.0254 -0.0055 -0.0017 -0.0845 -0.0826 -0.0878 -0.082 0.0003 
sd1 0.0168 -0.0038 0.0285 0.0083 0.0253 0.0318 0.0268 0.0404 -0.0155 
sd2 -0.2674 0.057 -0.0942 0.0617 -0.4399 -0.2431 -0.2911 -0.2376 -0.005 
sd3 0.114 -0.0502 -0.0248 -0.0306 0.1214 0.071 0.0804 0.1394 0.0768 
sd4 0.0797 -0.0107 0.0114 -0.0372 0.1378 0.0577 0.0895 0.0207 -0.0291 
sd5 -0.0295 -0.0057 0.0212 0.0144 -0.0457 0.0128 0.0139 0.1143 -0.0002 
sd6 -0.0361 0.0344 0.0276 0.0277 0.0036 0.0393 0.0461 -0.0119 -0.0069 
sd7 0.0635 -0.0205 -0.0323 -0.0059 0.0619 0.0291 0.0375 0.0093 0.015 
sd8 0.0152 0.0259 -0.0167 -0.0213 0.1245 0.0447 0.051 -0.0524 -0.0573 
sd9 0.0398 -0.0162 0.0815 -0.0108 0.0483 0.0271 0.0295 0.0691 -0.004 
sd10 0.0247 -0.0092 -0.0174 0.0102 0.0682 0.0056 0.0147 -0.0137 -0.0372 
sd11 0.0379 -0.0156 0.1624 0.01 0.0112 0.0606 0.0541 0.1208 0.0026 
sd12 0.1156 -0.0367 0.0248 -0.0336 0.1266 0.0681 0.0771 0.1605 0.0635 
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Table A.6. Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
 livarea fireplace cond7 cond6 cond5 
livarea 1     
fireplace 0.4631 1    
cond7 0.2284 0.1072 1   
cond6 0.059 0.1144 -0.1887 1  
cond5 0.0134 0.0727 -0.2322 -0.2547 1 
cond4 -0.135 -0.1357 -0.2351 -0.2579 -0.3173 
cond3 -0.0962 -0.0844 -0.1657 -0.1817 -0.2236 
cond2 -0.0654 -0.081 -0.0921 -0.101 -0.1243 
sd1 0.0191 0.0011 -0.0233 -0.0011 0.0209 
sd2 -0.2217 -0.3363 -0.0385 -0.0864 -0.0857 
sd3 0.1509 0.1273 0.0328 0.0516 0.0237 
sd4 0.0057 0.0969 0.0025 0.0104 0.0039 
sd5 0.1167 0.0294 0.0257 -0.0069 -0.0056 
sd6 -0.0289 -0.0633 -0.0429 0.0004 0.0132 
sd7 0.023 0.0806 0.0895 0.0062 0.0051 
sd8 -0.0717 0.0248 -0.0241 0.0184 0.0245 
sd9 0.0621 0.0642 -0.0122 0.0412 0.0234 
sd10 -0.0051 0.0081 -0.012 0.0371 0.0268 
sd11 0.0972 0.0734 -0.0569 -0.0072 0.0341 
sd12 0.2082 0.1688 0.0765 0.0057 0.0019 
sd13 0.0361 0.0817 0.0308 0.0261 0.016 
story1 -0.5616 -0.266 -0.19 -0.0522 -0.0002 
story1_5 0.2517 0.1731 0.0187 0.0388 0.0163 
story2 0.4709 0.1801 0.212 0.0319 -0.0124 
eff_age -0.4373 -0.4577 -0.4082 -0.1436 -0.012 
school_age -0.0863 -0.0401 0.0479 0.0215 -0.0111 
commute_gt60 -0.0926 -0.0514 0.0313 0.0037 -0.0411 
below_poverty -0.3587 -0.3913 -0.0522 -0.0914 -0.0703 
white 0.2972 0.2638 -0.0254 0.0496 0.0515 
y06 0.0142 0.0426 -0.0473 -0.0122 -0.0123 
y07 0.0161 -0.0022 -0.0533 -0.083 -0.0611 
y08 -0.005 -0.0307 0.0737 0.0311 0.0165 
y09 -0.0164 -0.028 0.0588 0.0322 0.024 
y10 -0.0098 -0.0165 0.0292 0.0182 0.0086 
winter -0.0049 -0.018 0.0097 0.0096 -0.0015 
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Table A.6. Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
          
 atgarg atcp pool dtcp slab centralheat centralac baths lotarea 
sd13 0.0635 -0.0275 0.0224 -0.0152 0.0981 0.0527 0.0589 0.051 0.0184 
story1 -0.1536 0.0592 -0.0754 -0.0029 -0.1839 -0.1409 -0.1579 -0.5143 -0.0421 
story1_5 0.0596 -0.0153 0.0834 0.0255 0.0728 0.0774 0.0862 0.2604 0.0407 
story2 0.1384 -0.0592 0.0219 -0.0181 0.164 0.1063 0.1195 0.4023 0.018 
eff_age -0.5262 0.1736 -0.0225 0.1175 -0.6436 -0.4343 -0.4589 -0.5078 0.0409 
school_age 0.0664 -0.0221 -0.0994 -0.0217 0.1356 0.0287 0.033 -0.0549 -0.049 
commute_gt60 0.0211 0.0016 -0.0916 -0.0171 0.0438 -0.0278 -0.0416 -0.0965 -0.0119 
below_poverty -0.2323 0.0664 -0.1427 0.0545 -0.2285 -0.252 -0.2631 -0.3212 -0.0518 
white 0.0849 -0.0124 0.237 -0.0026 0.0927 0.187 0.2072 0.2975 0.0897 
y06 -0.0044 0.0018 0.0073 -0.0009 0.003 0.0142 0.0146 0.0117 0.0131 
y07 0.0078 0.0052 -0.0112 -0.0046 0.0161 0.0075 0.0108 0.0089 -0.0067 
y08 0.0063 -0.0028 -0.0086 0.0057 0.005 -0.025 -0.0263 -0.0088 0.0002 
y09 0.0064 -0.0053 -0.007 0.0082 0.0004 -0.0062 -0.0116 -0.0104 -0.0036 
y10 0.0005 0.0089 0.0057 -0.0025 0.0045 -0.0041 -0.0004 -0.0046 -0.0098 
winter -0.0032 -0.0085 0.007 -0.0015 -0.0109 -0.0028 -0.0081 -0.0059 0.0023 
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Table A.6. Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
 cond4 cond3 cond2 sd1 sd2 sd3 sd4 sd5 sd6 
cond4 1         
cond3 -0.2264 1        
cond2 -0.1259 -0.0887 1       
sd1 0.013 -0.0114 -0.002 1      
sd2 0.0883 0.064 0.0687 -0.1161 1     
sd3 -0.0392 -0.0379 -0.0406 -0.0402 -0.1761 1    
sd4 0.0009 -0.0031 -0.0139 -0.0705 -0.3093 -0.107 1   
sd5 -0.0042 -0.0035 -0.0021 -0.0068 -0.0299 -0.0103 -0.0181 1  
sd6 0.0214 0.0018 0.0039 -0.0337 -0.1478 -0.0511 -0.0898 -0.0087 1 
sd7 -0.0503 -0.0166 -0.0353 -0.0349 -0.1533 -0.053 -0.0931 -0.009 -0.0445 
sd8 -0.0252 0.0158 -0.007 -0.0584 -0.2563 -0.0887 -0.1557 -0.015 -0.0744 
sd9 -0.0207 -0.0249 -0.0128 -0.0144 -0.0632 -0.0219 -0.0384 -0.0037 -0.0184 
sd10 -0.0159 -0.0242 -0.0132 -0.0412 -0.1805 -0.0624 -0.1097 -0.0106 -0.0524 
sd11 0.017 0.0024 0.0103 -0.0344 -0.1507 -0.0521 -0.0915 -0.0088 -0.0437 
sd12 -0.0539 -0.0326 -0.0004 -0.0413 -0.1813 -0.0627 -0.1101 -0.0106 -0.0526 
sd13 -0.0248 -0.0227 -0.0298 -0.0363 -0.1593 -0.0551 -0.0968 -0.0093 -0.0462 
story1 0.1055 0.0837 0.046 -0.035 0.1546 -0.1268 -0.0146 -0.0593 0.0285 
story1_5 -0.0354 -0.021 -0.0236 0.0247 -0.0786 0.0281 0.0275 0.0016 -0.0117 
story2 -0.098 -0.084 -0.0358 0.0224 -0.1262 0.1328 -0.0048 0.0632 -0.0245 
eff_age 0.2423 0.1843 0.1296 0.0243 0.3401 -0.2068 -0.07 -0.003 0.0901 
school_age -0.0352 -0.0102 -0.0117 -0.0257 -0.1132 0.0648 0.0153 0.0251 -0.0246 
commute_gt60 0.001 -0.0018 0.0092 -0.1445 0.055 0.0824 0.0473 -0.0464 -0.1291 
below_poverty 0.0837 0.0626 0.0759 -0.0749 0.4268 -0.1147 -0.1308 -0.0315 0.0056 
white -0.0212 -0.0228 -0.0367 0.0746 -0.3125 -0.0315 0.2271 0.1021 0.0463 
y06 0.0023 0.0665 0.0144 0.001 -0.0056 0.0062 -0.0001 -0.0128 -0.0055 
y07 -0.0259 0.1259 0.1479 -0.0055 -0.0118 0.0101 0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0021 
y08 -0.0021 -0.0833 -0.0562 -0.004 0.0035 0.0056 -0.0082 -0.0124 0.0005 
y09 0.0061 -0.0834 -0.0584 0.0017 0.0073 -0.0162 -0.0043 0.0072 0.0061 
y10 0.0005 -0.037 -0.0307 0.0053 -0.0058 -0.0125 0.0024 0.0128 0.0201 
winter 0.0084 -0.0199 -0.0097 0.0051 -0.0006 -0.0029 -0.0037 -0.0016 0.016 
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Table A.6. Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
 
sd7 sd8 sd9 sd10 sd11 sd12 sd13 story1 story1_5 
sd7 1         
sd8 -0.0772 1        
sd9 -0.019 -0.0318 1       
sd10 -0.0543 -0.0909 -0.0224 1      
sd11 -0.0454 -0.0759 -0.0187 -0.0534 1     
sd12 -0.0546 -0.0912 -0.0225 -0.0643 -0.0536 1    
sd13 -0.0479 -0.0802 -0.0198 -0.0565 -0.0471 -0.0567 1   
story1 0.013 -0.0113 -0.0548 -0.014 -0.0036 -0.1018 -0.0026 1  
story1_5 -0.0374 0.0094 0.0523 0.0084 0.0473 0.0266 0.0004 -0.5937 1 
story2 0.017 0.0069 0.0227 0.0108 -0.0359 0.1036 0.0036 -0.7164 -0.131 
eff_age -0.1304 -0.0557 -0.0511 -0.0472 0.0617 -0.1718 -0.0895 0.361 -0.1108 
school_age 0.0281 0.0499 0.03 0.0724 -0.1254 0.0538 0.0566 0.0062 -0.0326 
commute_gt60 -0.0659 0.0912 -0.0737 0.0102 -0.154 0.0741 -0.0466 0.0103 -0.0275 
below_poverty -0.0905 -0.0708 -0.0774 -0.0212 -0.075 -0.1445 -0.056 0.174 -0.0923 
white -0.1676 0.1745 0.1278 0.0137 0.2372 -0.1172 -0.0482 -0.1048 0.1081 
y06 0.0043 -0.0085 0.0103 -0.0123 0.0141 0.0154 -0.002 -0.0143 0.0274 
y07 0.0076 -0.0142 -0.0163 -0.0019 -0.0014 0.0249 0.0043 -0.004 0.0013 
y08 0.009 0.0136 -0.0177 0.0071 -0.0237 -0.001 -0.0001 -0.0018 -0.02 
y09 -0.0037 0.0069 0.0049 0.0239 -0.0045 -0.0241 -0.0023 0.0101 -0.0159 
y10 -0.0036 -0.0027 0.0029 0.0111 -0.0023 -0.0096 0.005 0.0071 -0.0111 
winter -0.0014 -0.0126 -0.0068 0.0031 0.0032 0.0085 0.0008 0.003 -0.0028 
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Table A.6. Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
 
 story2 eff_age school~e comm~t60 below_~y white y06 y07 
story2 1        
eff_age -0.3461 1       
school_age 0.024 -0.1548 1      
commute_gt60 0.0129 -0.0909 0.1807 1     
below_pove~y -0.1363 0.2575 0.1912 0.1549 1    
white 0.0331 -0.0356 -0.2924 -0.1758 -0.4284 1   
y06 -0.0045 0.0018 -0.0094 -0.0019 -0.0223 0.0137 1  
y07 0.0038 -0.0154 0.0167 0.0067 0.0163 -0.019 -0.2897 1 
y08 0.0208 -0.0173 0.0119 0.0093 0.0235 -0.0288 -0.2708 -0.2482 
y09 -0.0015 -0.0029 -0.0023 0.0018 0.0063 0.0029 -0.2122 -0.1945 
y10 -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0011 -0.019 0.0019 0.0067 -0.1067 -0.0978 
winter -0.0003 0.0085 0.0005 -0.0081 0.0066 -0.0061 0.1542 -0.1012 
 
Table A.6 Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
 y08 y09 y10 winter 
y08 1    
y09 -0.1818 1   
y10 -0.0914 -0.0716 1  
winter 
0.0268 -0.0262 0.194 1 
 
